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THE CASE OF MEXICO 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 

AND 

THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT WILSON 



BY 



RAFAEL DE ZAYAS ENRIQUEZ 

Author of "The Rise and Fall of President Diaz" 



Translated from the Spanish 
By ANDRE TRIDON 



NEW YORK 
ALBERT AND CHARLES BONI 
96 FIFTH AVENUE 
1914 







Copyright, 19 i4 

BY 

R. DE Zayas Enriquez 



AUG "I !9!4 



h.TU 



(g.UA376848 



CONTENTS 



PREFACE 9 

CHAPTER 1 13 

A LETTER TO FRANCISCO I. MADERO, PRESIDENT OP 

THE UNITED STATES OF MEXICO MY ESTIMATE OF 

HIS POSITION IN DECEMBER, 1911. 

CHAPTER II 35 

MADEBO THE IRRESPONSIBLE — ^A STRIKING CONTRAST 
BETWEEN MADERO AND PORFIRIO DIAZ — MADERO'S 
ADMINISTRATION — THE MANIFESTO OF GENERAL 
FELIX DIAZ. 

CHAPTER III • 60 

THE BLOODY TEN DAYS — THE CONSPIRACY — THE 
REVOLUTION GENERAL VICTORIANO HUERTA. 

CHAPTER IV 74 

CONTINUATION OF THE BLOODY TEN DAYS — THE 
OPTIMISTIC AND IRRESPONSIBLE MADERO THE DIPLO- 
MATIC CORPS THE MISSION OF THE SENATE GEN- 
ERAL VICTORIANO HUERTA — THE DILEMMA IN 
WHICH HE FOUND HIMSELF — THE DECISION TAKEN 
BY GENERAL HUERTA AND THE ARMY — THE FALL OF 
MADERO. 

CHAPTER V 104 

THE PACT OF THE CITADEL — THE RESIGNATION OP 
PRESIDENT MADERO AND VICE-PRESIDENT PINO 
SUAREZ — THE ORIGIN OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERN- 
MENT — THE DE FACTO GOVERNMENT BECOMES A 
GOVERNMENT DE JURE ACCORDING TO THE MEXICAN 
CONSTITUTION. 



CONTENTS— Continued 
CHAPTER VI 119 

GUSTAVO MADERO AND BASO ARE SENTENCED TO BE 
SHOT — THE DEATH OP EX-PRESIDENT MADERO AND 
EX-VICE-PRESn>ENT PINO SUAREZ. 

CHAPTER VII 136 

"the CASE OF Mexico" — president woodrow Wil- 
son — THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW. 

CHAPTER VIII ^. 146 

the policy of president huerta the "coup 

d'etat." 

CHAPTER IX 166 

"the MEXICAN problem" PRESIDENT WILSOn's 

attitude considered from the point of view op 
reason and justice. 

CHAPTER X 184 

THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION 

THE ATTITUDE OF PRESIDENT HUERTA AND ITS 

MEANING— ITS INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE. 

CHAPTER XI '197 

the wilson policy condemned by the entire 

world huerta the man of the situation 

time a solution should be found — the solution 
— ^Mexico's vitality. 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 



VICTORIANO HUERTA Frontispiece "^ 



FRANCISCO I. MADERO Facing page 34 "^ 

GENERAL BERNARDO REYES « " 60*^ 

FELIX DIAZ « " 80'^ 

GENERAL AURELIANO BLANQUET " « 100^ 
GENERAL M. MONDRAGON « « 126 



GENERAL GREGORIO RUEZ " " 188 ^ 



GENERAL PASCUAL OROZCO « « 152-^ 



PREFACE 

In writing this book I have not been 
prompted by patriotic motives, however 
justifiable and reasonable such motives 
might appear, nor have I yielded to any 
partisan bias. My primary, perhaps my 
sole object, has been to acquaint the world 
with the real causes of the convulsion 
which is now shaking Mexico, my native 
country, its intensity and its significance, 
and with the actual principles which are 
at stake in this hour of agony ; I also wish 
to show what a distorted conception the 
President of the United States has 
formed of the Mexican situation and what 
harmful consequences his attitude in the 
matter may have, not only for Mexico 
but for the United States as well. 

Unless I possess definite evidence to 
the contrary, I always assume that all in- 
dividuals are acting in good faith. I be- 
lieve, therefore, that President Wilson 
has been and is moved by perfectly honest 
motives; he has started, however, from 



erroneous premises and he has failed to 
foresee the consequences of the system he 
has endeavored to apply; he has failed to 
fathom the abyss towards which he is lead- 
ing two neighboring countries which have 
nothing to gain from an international 
conflict. 

A war between the two nations would 
be an utter disgrace, and its baneful 
effects, which would be felt all over the 
American continent, would alienate the 
sympathy of all the nations south of the 
Rio Grande from the United States. 

A Mexican by birth, I have devoted my 
life to the study of my countrymen, my 
country and its history, and I consider 
myself fully conversant with everything 
that concerns Mexico. I have also spent 
several years of my life on American soil, 
studying this country carefully and with- 
out any preconceived opinions, and I be- 
lieve I have a clear understanding of this 
nation which has always exerted a singu- 
lar fascination over me. 

This book, therefore, is neither an im- 
passioned eulogy on Mexico, nor an at- 
tempt at justifying the acts of the pro- 



visional government presided over by 
General Huerta, nor a fanatical attack 
on President Wilson or on the people 
whose destinies he is directing at the 
present time. 

Such an attitude on my part would be 
both undignified and improfitable, for it 
would only irritate the minds of my read- 
ers, instead of pacifying them, and would 
cast doubts on my construction of the 
facts, instead of carrying conviction. 

I have attempted to be an impartial 
observer and to analyze all facts with 
equanimity; I have no wish to deceive 
anyone, not even myself; I do not, how- 
ever, pretend to be infallible. 

It is fitting that the world should know 
all the facts connected with the present 
situation in Mexico. I have written this 
book that the world may be cognizant of 
the whole truth before passing judgment 
upon Mexico. 

Rafael de Zayas Enriquez. 
New York, January 1, 1914. 



CHAPTER I 

A LETTER TO FRANCISCO I. MADERO^ PRESI- 
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF MEXICO 
— MY ESTIMATE OF HIS POSITION IN 
DECEMBER^ 1911. 

I never was a conspirator or a revolu- 
tionist, nor did I ever swear unconditional 
allegiance to any government. I was a 
partisan of General Porfirio Diaz from 
the day when he first presented his candi- 
dacy to the presidency of the Republic; 
I upheld his policy when he assumed the 
control of the government, and supported 
him imtil the year 1906, when I separated 
myself from him, expressing frankly and 
openly the reasons for my changed atti- 
tude. 

I disagreed with his methods. I tried 
to make him see that he was heading the 
country unavoidably towards a revolu- 
tion. I vainly pointed out to him the one 
way to prevent that catastrophe and then 
I resigned my seat in the legislature and 

18 



14 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

came to this country, a voluntary exile, 
and lived in New York until 1910. 

In 1911, having been invited to take a 
position under the new government, I 
considered it my duty before asking for 
any post or accepting any appointment to 
write to President Madero the following 
letter which constitutes the logical intro- 
duction to my book. 

New York, December 29, 1911. 

To Francisco I. Madero, Esq., 

President of the United States of Mexico. 

My Dear Friend : — Our country is in danger. 
This is so obvious that even the most optimistic 
mind must recognize the fact. 

When our country is in danger all of us who 
call ourselves patriots have a right to speak our 
minds and to point out the ways and means 
which, according to our experience, are the best 
to forestall that danger, and to concentrate our 
energies and our good will in an effort to save 
her. This conviction and my sense of duty 
prompt me to address these lines to you. 

I did not approve of the revolution you 
headed; I accept it, however, not only as ac- 
complished facts have to be accepted, but be- 
cause it was the direct outcome of the state of 
affairs established and maintained for many 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 16 

years by General Porfirio Diaz. As I have 
proved it elsewhere,* Diaz was the prime factor 
of that revolution; he prepared it, made it in- 
evitable, caused it actually to break out. Upon 
him then must rest aU the responsibility for 
everything that has happened, everything that 
is happening, and not a few of the things 
which the future holds in store. 

But this does not relieve of aU responsibility 
the men who took part in the revolution, the 
nation in general, and you in particular, since 
you find yourself to-day at the head of the gov- 
ernment, to which position you were elected by 
a majority of the people to preside over their 
destinies. 

In electing you they did not mean to reward 
you for your successful leadership of the revo- 
lution, but only to voice their confidence in your 
future actions and express the hope that you 
would regenerate the country, do away with 
all that was wrong, promote everything that 
would contribute to her final welfare and estab- 
lish democracy on a firm basis. 

When President Diaz fell from power he left 
the country in a precarious predicament. 
Things went from bad to worse under the ad- 
ministration of De la Barra. Since you have 
come into power the situation has become 
desperate. 

* "Rise and Fall of Porfirio Diaz." 



16 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

Let us not mention General Diaz. His ac- 
tions have been judged and condemned. 

As far as the provisional president De la 
Barra is concerned, I notice that many people 
have absolved him from all blame, have almost 
m^ade a god of him, and are presenting him as 
an exemplary character, and his administration 
as a model for every patriot to admire. Those 
who see things more clearly and are less bent 
on flattering him concede that many wrongs 
were committed during his short term, but they 
excuse him on the plea that he was a mere 
figure head, carrying out your instructions, 
and that, to a certain extent, he succeeded in 
averting some of the pernicious consequences 
they would have had. 

Others see a contradiction in his attitude, 
and say that if he was a mere puppet in your 
hands and lent himself to such a combination, 
he could not be called a strong character or 
even a political personality. The man who, 
being placed at the head of a nation, obeys 
anyone's commands when he knows such com- 
mands to be harmful, or even allows anyone to 
carry out in his name plans he considers harm- 
ful, is neither a statesman, nor a diplomat, nor 
a ruler worthy of his nation's respect. 

Some people say that his attitude was dic- 
tated by a desire to preserve internal peace 
and enable the nation to hold orderly elections. 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 17 

Others assert that he failed to maintain peace 
or to assure orderly elections, for his term of 
administration was marked by many uprisings 
and acts of brigandage which remained un- 
punished; the elections, they say, were abso- 
lutely one-sided, for rival candidates were not 
allowed to attend to their campaign work and 
were deprived of the most elementary guaran- 
tees. Whether or not these were your doings, 
the hand was that of President de la Barra, and 
he shall answer for it before the tribunal of 
history. 

I neither condemn nor absolve Mr. de la 
Barra, for I have not the complete knowledge 
of all the details of his administration, of his 
understanding with General Diaz, who desig- 
nated him as his successor, and with you who 
accepted him as your champion. 

De la Barra's only redeeming grace was the 
self-abnegation with which he accepted an un- 
usual position which was almost impossible to 
hold, and succeeded in maintaining that posi- 
tion at the head of the government until such 
time when he could turn the control of it over 
to his legitimate successor. I render homage 
to the honesty of his private and public life, 
to his patience, his perseverance, and to the 
intelligence he displayed in leaving the country 
as soon as he had relinquished the presidency. 



18 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

I will now review the charges which have 
been brought against you. 

You are first charged with disturbing the 
peace and starting a revolution. I have shown 
in my book, "The Rise and Fall of President 
Diaz,"* that there never lived a man great 
enough to start a revolution. The revolution 
was prepared by the government itself; but 
you were its spirit incarnate; you gave it life 
and blood. President Diaz prepared the revo- 
lution for you and forced upon you the role of 
an apostle, of a martyr, and of a leader. 

We must never forget that it is overweening 
ambition, mismanagement, and acts of tyranny 
on the part of governments which give rise to 
revolutions and call its leaders into being. 

The first charge, then, is unfounded, for you 
were not responsible for the revolution; but 
you are responsible for its consequences, first, 
as rebel leader; second, as president. 

The second charge brought against you is 
that you entered into an agreement with the 
government immediately after the fall of 
Ciudad Juarez, instead of continuing the fight 
until the tyrant was overthrown. To me this 
proved only two things: Porfirio Diaz's in- 
telligence, for his attitude on that occasion 
crowned him with a halo, more apparent than 
real, of patriotism, and saved his pride, since 

* Published serially in the "Revista de Merida." 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 19 

he assumed the part of a ruler who abdicates 
rather than that of a tyrant overthrown by 
force. It also was an evidence of sound judg- 
ment on your part, since the aim of the revolu- 
tion was to eliminate Porfirio Diaz and his 
Camarilla ; both being willing to step out, there 
was no justification for inflicting further losses 
on the country by sacrificing more human lives 
and spending more money. 

Your accusers also say that you should have 
retired into private life as soon as the triumphs 
of the revolution, giving to the people unre- 
stricted freedom in the choice of their repre- 
sentatives, had been assured. Such a rare and 
noble discretion would have marked you as a 
modest and disinterested man; it remains to be 
seen, however, whether it was opportune for 
you to assume that attitude, whether your as- 
sociates in the revolution would have allowed 
you to assume it, and finally what might have 
come to pass if all the armed bands which had 
supported you had been left to shift for them- 
selves without being held together by the per- 
sonality of a leader recognized as the only and 
necessary one. To me this charge is futile and 
does not deserve to be even considered. 

You are also charged with assuming im- 
mediate control of the government, conducting 
yourself as the actual ruler of the nation, using 
De la Barra as a patient dummy, and exerting 



20 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

an autocratic power the more objectionable as 
it only aimed at promoting your own interests, 
and at insuring your election and the election 
of your proteges to the highest federal and 
state offices. 

You are also accused of having delivered 
speeches of a subversive nature; of having 
closed your eyes to the murderous deeds per- 
petrated in Puebla and other cities; of having 
been too lenient to Zapata and other rebel 
chieftains whose troups have become mere rob- 
ber gangs. Some of your critics commenting 
on this last charge explain that you had to re- 
sort to this expedient to make your election 
sure, to hold in check De la Barra, whom you 
had begun to suspect, and to protect yourself 
against a possible hostile move of the federal 
army upon whose loyalty you felt you could 
not depend. 

You are accused of having forced upon sev- 
eral of the States, for the purpose of insuring 
your victory at the polls, officials who were not 
popular with the people, and some of whom 
were greatly disliked; this caused much dis- 
satisfaction and endangered the public peace. 
Among those unwelcome officials I shall men- 
tion in particular Pino Suarez, whom you first 
had elected Governor of the State of Yucatan 
and whom later you imposed on the Republic 
as vice-president; thus you repeated the faults 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 21 

Diaz had committed, you caused divisions 
among the people, provoked the formation of 
new local and national factions, and furnished 
fuel to the opposition, all of which was the more 
unpardonable as it was unneccessary to insure 
your election. The support given you by your 
creatures added neither strength nor prestige 
to your cause. 

Those were the principal charges made 
against you as presidential candidate. I now 
come to those made against you as president. 

Your accusers say that after your election 
to the presidency you drove the nation to ex- 
asperation instead of quieting it; instead of 
reuniting your divided fellow citizens you made 
their differences more marked; instead of ex- 
terminating the brigand bands you allowed 
them to gain strength; instead of winning to 
your cause the discontented, you spurred them 
to more hostility and drove them into rebellion ; 
instead of pacifying the country and of rally- 
ing around you all the scattered energies, you 
kept the country in a state of disorder and 
finally became a storm centre; your attitude 
has so complicated the affairs of the country 
that a foreign intervention has become im- 
minent. 

I am not justified in passing judgment upon 
those charges, for I have lived too far from the 
scene of your activities ; besides, while they are 



22 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

presented in a rather matter of fact manner, 
they are all very complex. Furthermore, those 
who formulated them were at too close range 
to have a clear vision, and may have been im- 
pelled by animus or personal interest. I do not 
dare to form a definite opinion of this case until 
more light has been thrown upon it. 

What the majority of people contend, how- 
ever, is that there is no justification for the 
present situation, for they feel that the op- 
portunity was yours to establish on a firm basis 
a government which would have been respected 
by natives and foreigners alike. They say, in- 
deed, that you could have united the country 
instead of dividing it, by calling into the ranks 
of your administration men of a conciliatory 
turn of mind who would have offered serious 
guarantees to all parties, thus nipping in the 
bud all germs of discord. To accomplish this 
you only had to avoid making General Reyes 
your bitter enemy and the leader of the dis- 
contented, and to avail yourself of the coopera- 
tion of Mr. de la Barra. 

When you and Reyes concluded an agree- 
ment according to which both of you would run 
as presidential candidates, each preparing his 
own election in perfect freedom, the one who 
would be defeated pledging himself to support 
the administration of his fortunate rival, you 
made an auspicious beginning. Unfortunately 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 28 

that pact was not respected. Your followers, 
animated by a pernicious fanaticism (fanatic- 
ism is always pernicious), directed ferocious 
attacks against General Reyes, they threatened 
and persecuted him and made attempts against 
his life; they treated his partisans as though 
they were outlaws, and made you two political 
adversaries and personal enemies. Reyes had 
to resign his commission in the army and to 
leave the country in order to protect his free- 
dom and his life. 

Mr. de la Barra .was also subjected to all 
sorts of attacks at the hands of the Maderists 
who tried to ruin his prestige and to com- 
promise him. They aroused your suspicions 
against him, and when his candidcay to the vice- 
presidency was announced, the fight directed 
against him in order to assure the triumph of 
Pino Suarez was so bitter that Mr. de la Barra 
decided to leave the capital the very day when 
he turned the power over to you, to exile himself 
under the pretext of accepting an official ap- 
pointment, and to live abroad undisturbed. 

If you had respected your pact with Reyes, I 
aril sure you would have lost nothing and you 
would have gained a great deal. You would 
have stood high in the nation's esteem; your 
popularity would not have suffered in the least 
from such an act of generosity ; nor would your 
success at the polls have been in any way less 



24 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

assured; on the contrary, your triumph would 
have been more complete and more brilliant, for 
everyone would have been obliged to admit that 
your electoral campaign had been open and 
above suspicion, that you had respected le- 
gality, and that you had established the reign 
of democracy immediately after overthrowing 
tyranny. 

You would not only have triumphed but car- 
ried away all the honors of a victory honestly 
won. Reyes and the Reyists would have had no 
cause for complaining of you or for attacking 
you. Reyes would have been compelled to abide 
by your agreement; and, for personal reasons, 
would have been as faithful an ally of the new 
president as he had been of Porfirio Diaz. No 
one would have objected to your calling him to 
your side as your minister of war, and every- 
body would have appreciated the magnanimity 
of such an act. This would have greatly in- 
creased your prestige. Reyes defeated by you 
at the polls and then exalted by your adminis- 
tration would have brought to you the support 
of the military element and of a well organized 
party. 

De la Barra as vice-president would have 
proved a pacifying, conciliatory factor, a guar- 
antee to the representatives of conservatism. 
It would have established a diplomatic bond 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 26 

with the foreign powers, with the United States 
in particular. 

By calling General Reyes to your side you 
would have shown magnanimity; by keeping 
Mr. de la Barra in Mexico you would have 
shown gratitude; in both cases you would have 
shown yourself a clever statesman. Those two 
men standing at your side as yctur main col- 
laborators would have symbolized PEACE and 
HARMONY. 

Both would have undoubtedly endeavored to 
succeed you in the presidential chair at the ex- 
piration of 3'our term and, consequently, two 
powerful parties would have cropped up under 
their leadership; the Maderist party would 
have continued, however, to support you as 
long as you remained in power. All this would 
have meant in the end more stability and a 
smoother course for your administration. The 
two men would have paid particular attention 
to the discharge of their duties and promoted 
peace and prosperity for the sake of gaining 
greater popularity. 

As both of them would have been under your 
orders their following would have been unques- 
tionably, and without their being aware of it, in 
your control; and you would have been, in the 
last analysis, the only true leader. 

If either of them had shown himself restive 
or disloyal it could not have constituted a great 



26 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

danger for your administration; having him 
practically under your thumb you could have 
crushed him easily and held him up to the pub- 
lic scorn. 

You failed to see that, and you let the won- 
derful opportunity pass by; instead of the 
boon which we expected, we are facing the cal- 
amity we feared. The present situation, how- 
ever optimistic one may be, can only appear as 
chaotic, desperate, and, perhaps, a hopeless 
one. 

I would sum it up as follows: We have in 
Mexico a government which has failed thus far 
to establish itself firmly, shaken as it is by the 
machinations of anarchistic factions which can- 
not be held in check for lack of the proper ma- 
chinery. I may add that the foreign nations 
regard us with diffidence if not with disgust ; an 
intervention is becoming more and more the 
logical possibility, and will soon become a fact if 
we do not apply the proper remedy in time. 
The time to apply that remedy is now. 

Some say that the press unrestrained by any 
censorship, is to a great extent responsible for 
this deplorable state of affairs, and that the 
government has only one choice: either to sup- 
press the liberty of the press, which would be 
suicidal, or to tolerate its present attitude, the 
consequences of which will be fatal to the gov- 
ernment. The truth is that the government 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 27 

has never faced such an alternative. The sup- 
pression of the liberty of the press did not pre- 
vent the fall of President Diaz. A government 
does not succumb to the attacks of the press 
unless those attacks are justified by the govern- 
ment's deeds. When attacks by the press are 
unfounded they are of no consequence and even 
defeat their own purpose. Slander may prove 
effective, but only for a short time, arid when 
.the first effect has worn off, truth shines 
brighter than ever. 

Is there a way out of this difficulty.? There 
must be one. Every political and social prob- 
lem has its solution. Our first duty, however, 
is to determine where the remedy can be best 
applied. Many a ruler trying to solve the 
problem has considered that problem not from 
the nation's point of view but from his own, and 
has endeavored to solve it in a manner favor- 
able not to the welfare of the public but to his 
own private interests. The nation's and the 
ruler's interest are not always identical, but in 
the present case I consider that they could 
have been easily reconciled. 

To imagine for a minute that the problem 
could be solved by starting a new revolution, or 
as some call it wrongly a counter-revolution, 
would be the height of absurdity. A new revo- 
lution would only complicate the difficulties and 



28 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

bring about a consummation to be most feared : 
foreign intervention. 

What then is to be done? Let us consult our 
reason, our common sense: If whatever has 
been done to this day has proved disastrous, let 
us follow the opposite course and we may ex- 
pect gratifying results. 

Any attempt to establish an autocracy at 
this stage of the game, regardless of whatever 
name it might bear, would be a mistake. The 
idea of a family oligarchy would be absurd. To 
allow the rabble to assume the power would be 
a crime. To suppose that one mere magic for- 
mula can make democracy emerge triumphantly 
from this chaos would be to reveal a deplorable 
ignorance of the philosophy of history. De- 
mocracy is not a beginning but an end. In no 
country in the world has democracy, at the 
present day, more than a wished for possibility. 
Nowhere has it become a fact. Democracy will 
be and is beginning to be the result of a slow 
evolution, not of violent revolution. 

At this historical stage of our development, 
the most crucial that our country has reached, 
our first duty is to bring order out of this chaos. 
This is not the time to better a few details, but 
to create a whole system anew. The only sys- 
tem that can save us is that which was intro- 
duced by the constitution of 1857. The only 
political motive likely to bring about the de- 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 29 

sired results is pure patriotism. The secret 
of our salvation is contained in two words: 
Constitution and patriotism. 

The first step should be the establishment of 
peace. Order and morality will be the funda- 
mental principles which will lead to an era of 
confidence and prosperity. Finally the grad- 
ual application of democratic principles will en- 
able us to perfect our great work. 

Under the exceptional circumstances obtain- 
ing at the present day, can the efforts of one 
single man, however gifted he may be, bring 
forth the longed for results ? I answer emphati- 
cally: no. 

Can those results be brought forth by the 
efforts of only one of the parties into which our 
nation finds itself divided? I answer again: no. 

How then can those results be attained? By 
reuniting all the sane elements which are to- 
day being separated by a wider and wider 
chasm. I call sane elements all those which are 
not tainted with brigandage or crime. 

What is imperative at the present day is not 
to attempt a conciliation of the various parties, 
but, frankly speaking, to conclude a transaction 
with them; efforts made in common and re- 
sponsibilities incurred in common will gradually 
instill in the minds a powerful spirit of solid- 
arity. 

You must bear in mind that to make con- 



30 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

cessions does not necessarily mean to yield, 
and that to yield does not necessarily mean to 
be defeated. 

You must also bear in mind that political 
skill precludes a stubborn disposition and pre- 
supposes the capacity to adapt oneself to cir- 
cumstances. When circumstances are too 
mighty to be overcome we must submit to them, 
but only as a good pilot submits to the irresist- 
ible force of a current, though taking good 
care, until she reaches less dangerous waters 
where she can be easily steered, that the ship 
does not lose her rudder, nor become grounded 
on sand banks, or wrecked against rocks. 

No one can deny that you are in all legality 
the constitutional president of the United 
States of Mexico, for no one can deny that elec- 
tions were held, that the people cast their votes, 
and that you were elected by an overwhelming 
majority; the fact that either fear or caution 
or other motives kept other candidates from 
running against you is not sufficient to in- 
validate your election. It is an obvious, con- 
crete, and incontrovertible fact that you are the 
constitutional president de facto and de jure, 
and that you shall be recognized as such in 
Mexico and abroad. Your government as far 
as its legal basis is concerned is above criticism ; 
so much more so as according to modem legal 



THE CASE OF MEXICO «1 

conceptions the only lawful governments are 
governments de facto. 

The legality with which you are invested, 
however, the book you published on presidential 
problems and to which you owe your first fame, 
the San Luis manifesto which you issued when 
you assumed the leadership of the revolution, 
the proclamations and speeches you delivered 
when you were a candidate for the presidency, 
the solemn oath you took when you came into 
office, to respect and to make people respect the 
Mexican constitution with its by-laws and 
amendments, with the laws of reform and their 
corollaries, to discharge faithfully the duties of 
the office of president with which the nation 
had entrusted you for the welfare and pros- 
perity of the union; all these burden you with 
a great, with an enormous responsibility in 
your own eyes and the eyes of the whole nation. 

Can you afford, in view of such historical 
antecedents, after making such solemn promises 
and after assuming such sacred duties towards 
the nation, to repeat the mistakes of the past 
administration? Will you violate the constitu- 
tion and allow it to be violated, persecute the 
press, order arrests without warrant, executions 
without trial.'* 

How can you, after starting a revolution and 
overthrowing a government which, wfe laust not 



82 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

forget it, was a government de facto and de 
jure, treat as bandits and outlaws those who 
rise in arms against you, availing themselves of 
a right of which you availed yourself and re- 
sorting to the very tactics which enabled you 
to gain your present position? How can you 
muzzle the press when it resorts to the tactics 
to which you resorted when you started the 
revolution and when you went on your presi- 
dential campaign tour attacking savagely your 
political opponents and their supporters? 

Are you not courting the charge of using a 
double standard? Are you not showing a re- 
grettable lack of constancy? Are you not lay- 
ing destructive hands upon your own work? 

There are only two solutions to the present 
situation. You can either conclude the trans- 
action I suggested, or, if you cannot govern ac- 
cording to the constitution and with the support 
of the nation, resign. Otherwise you will 
gradually become unpopular and be swept away 
by an insurrection; and in your fall you will 
drag the country to destruction. 

My services are at the command of the gov- 
ernment as long as the interests of our coun- 
try are being safeguarded ; if the government, 
however, enters upon the wrong path, I shall 
feel compelled to withdraw my assistance in or- 
der to continue my work for the cause of the 
country, which to me is the most sacred cause. 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 83 

Do not attribute to vanity and presumption 
the attitude I assume. Far be it from me to 
think that I am of any weight in the political 
scales or can impose any conditions. My only 
motive in writing you this long letter is a desire 
to express to you my good will towards your 
government, pointing out the hidden obstacles 
against which it might wreck itself, and disclos- 
ing the reasons which might eventually compel 
me to separate myself from you and to carry on 
the struggle for the realization of my ideals, 
perhaps without affiliating myself with any 
party, a voluntary exile once more as I was 
during the last four years of President Diaz's 
administration ; for I am always ready to sacri- 
fice my own conveniences when the interests of 
my country are at stake. 

I do not know whether you will have the time 
and the patience necessary to peruse this long 
letter, or whether, having read it, you will give 
it any consideration; but that does not matter 
to me. I feel that I have performed my duty: 
as your friend, by telling you the truth and 
showing you the dangers that beset your path; 
as a citizen, by trying to save our country from 
the terrible danger of a foreign intervention, for 
which history would blame the irresponsible 
actions of the people and the conscienceless at- 
titude of the government. 



B4> THE CASE OF MEXICO 

I remain your sincere friend, who wishes you 
the best success, for your own good and for the 
good of the country, 

Rafaei. de la Zayas ENmauEz. 





FRANCISCO I. MADERO 



CHAPTER II 

MADERO THE IRRESPONSIBLE — ^A STRIKING 
CONTRAST BETWEEN MADERO AND POR- 
FIRIO DIAZ MADERO^S ADMINISTRA- 
TION THE MANIFESTO OF GENERAL 

FELIX DIAZ. 

Many considered Francisco I. Madero 
a criminal character. In my opinion 
he was merely an irresponsible individual 
lacking in balance, harmless as long as he 
remained in the obscurity of private life; 
dangerous, however, when he took an ac- 
tive part in politics, and positively harm- 
ful when he assumed control of the gov- 
ernment. He personally did little harm, 
but he allowed others to do an appalling 
amount. 

In his egotism he imagined himself to 
be an apostle, a prophet, a heroic warrior 
and a social redeemer, although he lacked 
the ability to perfect any plans, to estab- 
lish a system, to fight a battle, to govern 
a country, even to carry out orders. 

35 



86 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

Every one of his acts furnished ample 
proof of his incompetence. 

On countless occasions the press and 
the insurgents charged him with break- 
ing the solemn engagements he had taken 
before the revolution of 1910 and after 
its triumph to establish a democratic re- 
gime in Mexico. That charge was abso- 
lutely unfounded as I shall prove by quo- 
tations from the San Luis manifesto, his 
revolutionary programme and platform, 
from his addresses and messages, and from 
the after-dinner speeches he delivered 
after his party came into power. 

A perusal of those documents reveals 
a notable consistency between his words 
and his deeds; those who pretend that 
Madero failed to come up to their expec- 
tations reveal merely their lack of infor- 
mation and understanding. 

If we read carefully the San Luis 
manifesto we will see that it can not in 
any way be considered as emanating from 
a political party, nor even from a small 
group of individuals, and that it is in no 
wise national in character. It is simply a 



THE CASE OP MEXICO 8T 

personal document, an extremely per- 
sonal one in which the I's play a promin- 
ent part, "we" being used very seldom 
and only when Madero refers to Fran- 
cisco Yasquez Gomez. Excerpts like 
the following will illustrate my point: 

"Following the wise custom which ob- 
tains in republican countries I visited 
various parts of this republic, and appeal- 
ed to my fellow citizens. Every one of 
my speaking tours was truly a triumphal 
march, . . . The day came at last 
when General Diaz realized the actual 
situation of the republic and understood 
that he could no longer combat me with 
any chance of success in the arena of de- 
mocracy, and he gave orders to arrest 
me/^ 

''I realize that if the people have se- 
lected me as candidate for the presidency, 
it is because they have found in me not 
so much the qualities that constitute a 
statesman or an organizer but the virility 
of a patriot, ready to sacrifice himself. 
. . . When I threw myself into the 
fight for democracy / knew well that 



8& THE CASE OF MEXICO 

General Diaz would never respect the ex- 
pressed wishes of the people; when the 
noble Mexican nation supported me at 
the polls it knew very well also what out- 
rages it would have to expect. ..." 

"Besides the attitude of the population 
before, during, and after the elections re- 
vealed a violent opposition to General 
Diaz's government and proved that if the 
elections had been held fairly I would 
have been elected president of the repub- 
lic. On the strength of which, constitute 
ing myself the mouthpiece of the nation's 
will, I hereby declare the last election il- 
legal, and the Republic finding itself con- 
sequently without a legitimate govern- 
ment, I assume the provisional presi- 
dency of the Republic." 

*^T declare in all honor that I would 
consider it as a weakness on my part and 
as treason to the nation which has accord- 
ed me its confidence not to place myself at 
the head of my fellow citizens who are 
calling upon me anaciously from every 
part of the country to compel General 



THE CASE OP MEXICO ^ 8ft 

Diaz by the force of arms to respect the 
nation's wishes." 

The foregoing is amply sufficient to 
give an idea of the San Luis Manifesto 
and to reveal Madero's psychology. 
Pompous, vain, arrogant phraseology, in 
which the first person recurs constantly; 
misrepresentations and exaggerations. 
That a part of the population designated 
Madero for the presidency is true, but to 
say that the population, or even the ma- 
jority of the population did so, is a gra- 
tuitous falsehood. Madero could truth- 
fully state that the people of Mexico had 
had no opportunity to discover his gifts as 
a statesman; but neither had it had a 
chance to judge his virile patriotism. 
The Mexican nation never supported him 
personally at the polls nor during the 
revolution. The Mexican people never 
called upon him (let us pass by the word 
"anxiously") to head the revolt. The 
truth is that it wasn't Madero who started 
or even headed the revolution, but Pascual 
Orozco, Jr. and Pascual Orozco, Sr. in 
the North, and the brothers Zapata in 



40 THE CASE OP MEXICO 

the South; to be perfectly accurate I must 
say that the first revolutionary move was 
made by Aquiles Serdan of Puebla, who 
was not acting in concert with Madero 
any more than the Zapatas were at first. 

In all the addresses and after-dinner 
speeches which Madero delivered after the 
revolution, when he was a candidate for 
the presidency, he showed himself a mere 
demagogue, promising to the people what- 
ever he happened to think of, without 
waiting to be asked for it, and as though 
he were absolute master of everybody's 
life and property; he corrupted the army 
by bribery, alienating the good will of 
the commanding officers; in an address to 
the inmates of the Monterey Penitentiary 
he went so far as to say that many people 
were at large who deserved to be im- 
prisoned much more than they. 

He never carried favor with the nation 
itself but with the lowest and roughest 
populace whose coarse instincts he arous- 
ed, with the bandits serving sentences in 
prisons, promising to them a government 
by the olocracy, the domination of the 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 41 

lower classes to the detriment of the 
others. 

It is a fact that in crises and periods of 
disorder, vice and virtue run to extremes, 
and human nature reveals itself in its high- 
est and its lowest, particularly in its low- 
est, aspects. In 1910, a year of crises 
and disorder, Madero revealed the powers 
for evil that lay in him; egotism, megalo- 
mania, hankering for popular applause; 
among the roughest element of the popu- 
lation there flamed up all the evil in- 
stincts which had been kept down for 
thirty years by the iron hand of President 
Diaz; it was the populace, not the honest 
working class population which howled, 
"Our day has come," and insulted by 
words, gestures and even by deeds of 
violence the most respected women in 
Mexican society. 

These happenings were not the result of 
Madero's machinations; his ill-balanced 
mind could not cope with the newly cre- 
ated situation; therein we fuid the most 
convincing proof of his irresponsible 
character. 



42 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

Madero was not born to be a leader. 
Superficial in his judgments, stubborn 
in his capriciousness, fettered by many 
superstitions, he was not what is called a 
personality, he was merely an abnormal 
type. 

He trusted his luck; and all his parti- 
sans always harped on his luck, which 
they considered as infallible. Madero 
and his followers knew nothing of logic, of 
the relation between cause and effect, the 
basis of all events, the fundamental prin- 
ciple of the universe. 

Attempts have been made to establish 
a parallel between President Madero and 
President Porfirio Diaz. While we ob- 
serve between the two a striking contrast 
we fail to discover any point of re- 
semblance. 

If I go into such details it is not for 
the sake of making this book more read- 
able but in order to visualize better for 
my readers the personality of Madero. 
An understanding of his psychology fur- 
nishes a key to the causes of the revolution 
which overthrew him. Besides I consider 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 4« 

biographical information as one of the 
most important elements of history. 

When I state that there is absolutely 
no possible comparison between the two 
men, I should not be suspected of any 
partisan bias, for I broke openly with the 
Porfirists some seven years ago. 

One could not find two personalities 
more unlike than those of the last two 
presidents of Mexico. 

Porfirio Diaz came from a poor family 
and received all his training in his struggle 
for existence and on the battlefield, gain- 
ing quite a reputation as a soldier before 
he rose to the presidency. 

Francisco I. Madero was born to 
wealth, spent his life among the business 
men and merchants who composed his 
family circle, and was elevated to the 
highest position in the republic by un- 
foreseen events. 

Porfirio Diaz brought to the presidency 
the vast knowledge of men and of con- 
ditions he had acquired during his career 
as a soldier, administrator of large dis- 
tricts, politician and insurgent leader. 



44 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

Madero was an improvised politician, 
an improvised revolutionist, and an impro- 
vised president, lacking entirely not only 
in practical but even in theoretical know- 
ledge of warfare, politics and administra- 
tion, unacquainted even with his associates 
and with the conditions of the country. 

Diaz is a man of courage, with the quiet 
and conscious bravery of one who knows 
danger and who instead of rushing into it 
blindly, meets it and measures it coolly, 
and then devises ways of overcoming it. 

Madero displayed the blind and un- 
reasoning daring of the irresponsible. He 
rushed headlong like a projectile, caring 
little where he was to land or what the 
effects of his action would be. 

Porfirio Diaz can hold his tongue. He 
only speaks when he has something to say, 
and then he says exactly what he has 
made up his mind to say, not a word more, 
not a word less. 

Madero never knew the value of dis- 
cretion and suffered from an incurable 
loquacity; he would speak of everything 
and everybody; little he knew, when he 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 46 

rose to speak, what he was to speak about ; 
he became intoxicated with the sound of 
his own voice, going always farther than 
he should have gone, and revealing many 
things he should have kept to himself. 

Diaz hardly ever spoke of himself, and 
when he was compelled to do so used "we" 
instead of "I." 

Madero never spoke except in the first 
person singular. He was the everlast- 
ing I. 

Diaz only informed the public of his 
notable actions and valuable accomplish- 
ments and left his own personality in the 
shadow, knowing well that the public and 
his adulators could be relied upon to 
throw it into relief and to exaggerate his 
personal traits. 

Madero made extraordinary efforts to 
become the center of interest, a unique 
personage, the cynosure of all eyes, as 
though he suspected that in no other way 
could a man of his small stature command 
any attention. Madero was a small 
figure, physically and intellectually. 

Diaz assumed the power with one am- 



46 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

bition in his heart: to make himself great 
by adding to his country's greatness. 

Madero had one pet ambition and also 
certain definite plans. It was his am- 
bition to witness his own apotheosis. It 
is said that his plans were mainly to stave 
off the ruin of his family then heavily in- 
volved. This was at least generally ad- 
mitted. 

Plutarch would not have devoted a 
chapter to Diaz's life, but Diaz would 
have fitted into Machiavelli's Prince. 

Madero remained in spite of his tragic 
end a Molieresque personage. His life 
was a gruesome farce, ending with a catas- 
trophe. 

Porfirio Diaz sacrificed many victims in 
order to establish and maintain a political 
systfem that would insure peace. A War- 
sovian peace it was called by many men 
of unbiased minds, an educational peace, 
Diaz called it, for he considered it as the 
only means of training his fellow citizens 
for a life of order and labor. 

Madero took as many lives as Diaz did, 
or perhaps more, in a shorter period of 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 47 

time; he inaugurated an era of terrorism, 
not for political reasons, not for educa- 
tional purposes, but in order to achieve 
his personal ends and to further the inter- 
ests of his family. 

Porfirio Diaz filled the national treas- 
ury with a surplus of several millions ; Ma- 
dero left it considerably depleted. 

Diaz established the credit of the nation 
on a firm basis; he himself made use of 
that credit for illegitimate ends at times. 
The many loans he negotiated through 
his minister Limantour enriched consider- 
ably the members of the so-called Scien- 
tific Party headed by Limantour himself. 
It cannot be denied, however, that those 
loans enabled him to finance and carry out 
large enterprises of national utility. 

Madero also floated many loans from 
which, however, the country never derived 
any benefit ; it was said that they were is- 
sued in order to organize a large standing 
army; but the army was never organized, 
Madero failed to preserve order in Mexico 
and to put an end to the anarchistic con- 



48 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

ditions which became intolerable during 
his funest term of administration. 

Diaz manufactured out of whole cloth 
legends likely to win popularity for his 
proteges. Madero was always busy 
manufacturing alleged plots which his 
police always nipped in the bud; comic 
opera conspiracies to kidnap him, to over- 
throw him, to assassinate him ; when at last 
one real conspiracy was formed, neither he 
nor his police had wind of it until the revo- 
lution was well on its way. 

The chief difference between the two 
men, however, was the fact that Porfirio 
Diaz always acted after due deliberation, 
while Madero acted upon impulse. 

Porfirio Diaz had a genius for meeting 
emergencies. Madero was a mere ama- 
teur without any talent for any definite 
kind of work. 

At the time of his fall Porfirio Diaz 
predicted that Madero could not rule 
Mexico unless he adhered to the methods 
he had established. The old warrior for- 
got that it requires an Alexander to tame 
a Bucephalus. ^ ^ ^ 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 49 

We give our sympathy to revolutionists 
or withhold it according to the cause they 
champion, but the results of a revolution 
alone justify it or condemn it. 

When Madero rose up in arms, he en- 
listed the sympathies of all, because he 
voiced the people's desire to end the un- 
usual term of office of President Diaz and 
especially of the men who constituted the 
power behind the throne, the "Scientific 
Group". The sympathies, however, went 
to the revolution itself, not to its leader. 
When the battle was won, the nation re- 
peating the traditional mistake of nations 
relapsed into personalism, worshipped 
the victor and marveled at the ease with 
which he had triumphed. 

Here begins the second act of the 
drama, Madero assumed the control of 
the government, not as some pretend, 
through election frauds, although he re- 
sorted, before the elections, to a good deal 
of violence and to more or less justifiable 
intrigues. By threats and intimidations 
he compelled Congress to advance the date 
of the elections ; he persecuted other candi- 



60 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

dates who were to enter the presidential 
contest independently. He forced upon 
the States functionaries, who were not 
only his partisans but his avowed accom- 
plices. He imposed upon the nation 
Pino Suarez as candidate for the vice 
presidency. On election day there was no 
candidacy possible besides his own. I am 
positive that if he had refrained from such 
untoward actions, if he had given the pub- 
lic absolute freedom, he would have car- 
ried the election just the same. His at- 
titude on that occasion harmed him much 
more than it helped him. 

The nation then found itself in great 
suspense. No man with a spark of com- 
mon sense ever expected Madero to ful- 
fil even one half of the promises he had 
made as revolutionary leader or as presi- 
dential candidate; it would have been be- 
yond the limits of the possible. But he 
was expected to inaugurate at least a 
regime of order and justice. Madero un- 
fortunately was himself caught in the 
snares he had set. He failed to surround 
himself with men of integrity and of 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 61 

proved patriotism; he refused to listen to 
advice ; he remained the leader of a clique 
instead of becoming the leader of a nation; 
he gave a free hand in the conduct of gov- 
ernmental affairs to a coterie which proved 
more predatory than even the Scientific 
Group. It is now a recognized fact that 
his administration meant disaster for 
Mexico from every point of view, political, 
administrative and international. 

The Madero revolution was not a revo- 
lution but rather a scandal and a calamity; 
it found no justification in its results and 
therefore sentence was passed upon it 
without appeal. 

The whole country began anew to mani- 
fest its unrest. Revolutionary groups 
sprang up in the Northern, in the South- 
ern, and in the Central States ; they lacked 
coherence and leaders of prestige; the 
same desire, however, animated them all. 
They were all bent on overthrowing Ma- 
dero. 

In the few months during which Ma- 
dero remained at the head of the adminis- 
tration, that is from July 1, 1912, to Feb- 



62 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

ruary, 1913, he squandered (besides the 
current receipts and the seventy and some 
odd million pesos President Diaz had left 
in the treasury when he relinquished the 
presidency) $35,000,000 more than the 
budget called for. 

Before the fiscal year 1910-1911 the lia- 
bility account of the nation amounted to 
from $300,000 to $400,000. In that year, 
on the other hand, that amount was 
doubled (exactly $995,521.78), and on 
June 30, 1912, it had jumped up to 
$19,001,951.34. 

Where had all those millions gone to? 
To this day that mystery has not been un- 
raveled. 

After Madero's fall the provisional gov- 
ernment disposed of only the $189,098.33 
in cash left in the treasury and of $874,- 
524.48 deposited by the Treasury with the 
National Bank. 

Carlos Toro in his essay on **The Over- 
throwing of Madero by the Diaz Revolt" 
summarizes as follows the conditions ob- 
taining at the very time when the Diaz re- 
volt was on the point of breaking out. 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 6B 

"At the beginning of the current year 
(1913) the (Maderist) party was utterly 
discredited. Many positive charges have 
been made against it : It had, its enemies 
said, organized and was supporting the 
Porra.* 

"It recruited into its ranks all the inca- 
pables of the nation; it displayed an intol- 
erant if not terroristic attitude towards 
its opponents ; it ignored the excesses and 
indecent practices of government officials 
in their private life; it persecuted the 
press ; it allowed men in authority to com- 
mit assassination without process of law; 
it permitted the daily slaughter of Mexi- 
cans under the pretext that they were 
revolutionists ; it demoralized the army by 
allowing jail birds, freed illegally, to en- 
list. Other charges brought against it 
were: failure to comply with the extra- 
ordinary promises made to the working 
class; the shady, dishonest deals closed 
with United States capitalists ; the doubt- 
ful origin of the funds with which Madero 

* A clique led by Gustavo Madero, the president's 
brother, which committed many acts of violence. 



64 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

financed his revolution; the considerable 
sums* taken from the public treasury and 
lent to the president's brother (Gustavo 
Madero) without collateral; the influence 
that adventurers and other unconscionable 
characters had upon the president; the 
mysterious vitality of the Zapatist revolt ; 
the unspeakable deals of Gustavo Ma- 
dero; the police persecution of indepen- 
dent citizens; the framed-up conspiracy 
cases which excused the jailing of harm- 
less persons ; the insults offered to respect- 
ably constituted bodies; the direct ap- 
pointment by the government of officials 
who should have been selected by regular 
election; the obstinacy with which the 
party supported secretaries of state re- 
pudiated by public opinion; the insolence 
of the government organs; the clubbing 
or stoning of people who were not on 
friendly terms with the government, and 
the fires that had broken out in their 
houses; the feasts and entertainments co- 
inciding with the most painful scenes of 



♦ Estimated at $700,000. 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 66 

national grief; the orgies indulged in by 
certain "Renovators"* in public places of 
amusement; finally the scandalous dis- 
mantling of Salina Cruz, considered by 
everybody as the first step towards a 
criminal act of treason. 

"So many causes of irritation kept the 
nation in a state of mind similar to that of 
a patient who, realizing that the amputa- 
tion of a limb has become imperative, can- 
not, however, resign himself to the opera- 
tion and tries to soothe the pain that is tor- 
turing him by the use of drugs and opiates. 

"While Madero was talking himself 
hoarse about legality, the nation as a 
whole, and even Madero's worst enemies 
had made up their minds to respect legal- 
ity to the utmost limit, so as not to estab- 
lish in Mexican history the detestable pre- 
cedent of a president regularly elected be- 
ing overthrown by violence. This is the 
reason why the revolts of Pascual Orozco 
and of General Bernardo Reyes were not 
successful; this is why the country toler- 

*An opprobrious epithet applied to Madero's sup- 
porters. 



56 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

ated in silence the ineptitudes of its presi- 
dent, the violence and the unbridled license 
of his henchmen. If Madero had not pre- 
pared his own downfall, this consumma- 
tion, both desired and feared, would not 
have been brought about.'* 

The truth is that the nation gave no 
support to its government because it had 
no confidence in that government and re- 
sented its shocking machinations; neither 
did the nation support the revolutionists 
because it failed to find among them one 
striking personality offering positive 
guarantees for the future. 

On October 16, 1912, General Felix 
Diaz, followed by a part of the Federal 
garrison, headed an insurrectional move- 
ment in the city of Vera Cruz, the main 
port of the Mexican Republic. He in- 
tended to pacify the country with the help 
of justice, and he directed to the army the 
following manifesto: 

"Noble army to which it has been my 
honored privilege to belong since the days 
of my youth and from which it is now my 
painful duty to separate myself as a 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 57 

violent protest against the necessity 
placed upon us of recognizing as our 
equals, and even our superiors, criminals 
rescued from the steps of the scaffold, 
foreign adventurers or mere relatives of 
our ruler. My comrades, and especially 
you, my brothers, the alumni of the 
glorious Military College, I appeal to you. 
As I said expressly before the supreme 
authorities which governed our country on 
August 21, 1909, in the address I de- 
livered on the occasion of the closing exer- 
cises of our association, discipline ends 
when the supreme interest of the country 
begins; the sword which the nation has 
given you to be used in its defense has 
been transformed by the present govern- 
ment into a hangman's axe by means of 
which it is trying to impose its tyranny. 
I call upon you to join hands with us in 
carrying out the work of justice." 

The revolt of General Diaz awoke many 
sympathies among the Mexican popula- 
tion and even in foreign countries. Pleas- 
ant hopes were built upon its possible suc- 
cess. Unfortunately its young leader, 



58 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

rich in valor and self-confidence, was lack- 
ing in experience and in organizing ability. 
He was betrayed and captured by the 
Maderist troops which had promised him 
their assistance and had entered Vera 
Cruz waving white flags and acclaiming 
Felix Diaz. The officers involved in this 
incident have not been able to deny nor 
to explain that stratagem satisfactorily. 

Madero ordered that Felix Diaz be 
tried by a court-martial extraordinary 
before which the rebel leader declared 
that he alone was guilty and that he as- 
sumed the entire responsibility for the re- 
volt. The court-martial sentenced him 
to death, but the execution did not take 
place, as the attorneys for the defendant 
appealed to the Federal Supreme Court, 
which suspended the sentence. 

Efforts have been made to create the 
impression that Felix Diaz had escaped 
with his life thanks to Madero's clemency. 
There is no evidence to that effect. 

Members of the Porra, of which Gus- 
tavo Madero was the leader, did every- 
thing in their power to bring about the 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 69 

execution of Felix Diaz; they organized 
a popular demonstration in which the 
scum of the city, the lowest slum rabble, 
took part, carrying posters with sanguin- 
ary mottoes and howling at the top of 
their voices for the head of Felix Diaz. 

A committee of the leading women of 
Mexico City and a committee of news- 
papermen called upon President Madero 
petitioning him to spare the life of his un- 
fortunate adversary ; the only answer they 
received was to the effect that Madero 
had made up his mind to put Diaz to 
death, for such was the will of the people. 
That he did not proceed with the execu- 
tion was due only to the energetic atti- 
tude of the Supreme Court, whose de- 
cree he did not dare to disregard. 

Felix Diaz was at first held in the 
prison of San Juan de Ulua, then trans- 
ferred to the capital and committed to 
the penitentiary. At that time General 
Bernardo Reyes was also in Mexico City, 
an inmate of the military prison of San- 
tiago Tlaltelolco. 



CHAPTER III 

THE BLOODY TEN DAYS THE CONSPIRACY 

THE REVOLUTION GENERAL VIC- 

TORIANO HUERTA. 

The Vera Cruz manifesto was issued a 
little prematurely. For this Colonel 
Diaz Ordaz was responsible. The Vera 
Cruz insurrection was to be the signal for 
the uprisings of several anti-Maderist 
groups. General Bernardo Reyes was to 
be liberated from the military prison and 
taken to Toluca where insurgents would 
join hands with some sympathetic federal 
regiments and with the rebel forces scat- 
tered over the State of Mexico. 

The conspirators of Mexico City, see- 
ing the turn which affairs were taking in 
Vera Cruz, concentrated their efforts on 
the liberation of General Reyes ; at the 
precise moment when their plans were to 
be crowned with success, news reached 
them of Felix Diaz's discomfiture. They 
at once gave up their activities for fear 
Madero might order the execution of the 

60 




GENERAL BERNARDO REYES 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 61 

Vera Cruz chieftain, but they continued 
their preparations in secret. 

One of the rebel groups was ready for 
action at the beginning of December, 
1912. It was officered by Generals Ber- 
nardo Reyes and Gregorio Ruiz, by Cap- 
tains Romero Lopez, Tapia y Mendoza, 
the corps of cadets, and Colonel Zozaya, 
warden of the military prison, and it com- 
prised among other civil personalities Dr. 
Espinosa de los Monteros and Rafael de 
Zayas, of the Reyes party, Juan Palacios 
and Francisco de P. Senties, of the Vas- 
quez party, Miguel Mendizabal, formerly 
associated with Zapata, Pedro Duhart, a 
follower of Mondragon, Mayor Solache, 
partisan of Diaz, and S. Savinon, inde- 
pendent anti-Maderist. 

It was necessary to select a chief who 
would conduct the military operations, 
and all the unanimous choice of the 
rebels fell upon General Victoriano 
Huerta, who had recently returned to 
Mexico City after winning much com- 
mendation for the campaign conducted by 



62 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

the Northern army division which was 
under his orders. 

Instead of showing gratitude to Gen- 
eral Huerta for the immense service he 
had rendered to Madero by holding in 
check, driving away, and finally annihil- 
ating Orozco's bands which had been ad- 
vancing victoriously towards the heart of 
Mexico, the Maderists fought the victori- 
ous veteran in an underhand way, in 
order to offset his increasing popularity. 
The official organs did not hesitate to fling 
insults in his face, and the government 
even began to persecute him. 

When General Huerta, suffering from 
severe eye trouble, went to Dr. Aureliano 
Urrutia's sanatarium to be operated upon, 
the Maderists left him in peace for a while. 
In his retreat, however, he received many 
calls from Joaquin Claussell, a young 
lawyer, a brilliant and resolute man and 
a good friend of Dr. Urrutia, and from 
Fernando Gil, a man of distinguished in- 
tellect and of sound judgment, an old par- 
tisan of Reyes and related through his 
wife's family to General Huerta. These 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 63 

two men assumed the task of preparing 
the hero of the Northern campaign to ac- 
cept the leadership of the projected in- 
surrection; hut they could not make him 
break his allegiance to the government. 
General Manuel Mondragon had also 
organized a group of officers and citizens, 
among whom were Rodolfo Reyes, Gen- 
eral Reyes's son, and Cecilio L. Ocon, a 
daring young man who was the heart and 
soul of the Felix Diaz revolt, and who 
negotiated with the group mentioned pre- 
viously for a joint action which was likely 
to be more successful. The alliance was 
concluded on the understanding that Gen- 
eral Reyes and Felix Diaz would be the 
leaders of the revolt, that the former 
would be commander-in-chief, assume the 
provisional presidency with the attributes 
of a military dictator, and issue a call for 
presidential elections, after which all 
would do their best to assure the election 
of Felix Diaz. 

Those plans were made quite openly; 
but the government, carried away by its 
optimism, paid no attention to them, and 



64 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

never modified its attitude. To those who 
warned him Madero answered invariably : 
"Nobody can down me; I represent legal- 
ity." 

The army was incensed over Madero's 
ill-disguised contempt for it. The presi- 
dent was busy levying corps after corps 
of rurales with a view to making them his 
main support, thus gaining the upper 
hand over the regular troops, which he 
would disband whenever possible. He 
created the ranks of honorary colonels 
and honorary brigadier-generals, and con- 
ferred them indiscriminately upon men 
who had never served in the regular army, 
for instance upon General Francisco 
Villa, a well known brigand chief. Fran- 
cisco Villa had been placed under arrest 
by General Huerta during the Northern 
compaign for grave insubordination and 
sent to the capital to be court-martialed. 
Madero sent him to the penitentiary, 
where he was treated with every possible 
regard; after a short period of detention 
he received some ftmds from Madero, who 
allowed him to escape. Thereuj^On the 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 65 

minister of war and the president tele- 
phoned to General Huerta, telling him of 
Villa's escape and advising him to be on 
his guard, as Villa had sworn he would 
kill him. Huerta answered coolly that he 
was thankful for the warning, but that 
such advice was quite superfluous. 

The date of the revolt was changed sev- 
eral times ; several times orders were given 
and then withdrawn; this caused much 
friction between the organizers of the re- 
bellion, for everything was in readiness, 
and delay alone was dangerous. 

On Saturday, February 8, 1913, every- 
thing was ready, and it was decided to 
take action the following day. General 
Mondragon was in favor of waiting until 
the 10th. Only it was discovered that one 
of the officers admitted into the conspiracy 
had betrayed his associates to Gustavo 
Madero, and that the rebels would be ar- 
rested that night and shot on the spot. 
After a long discussion General Mondra- 
gon decided to strike the blow on Sunday 
morning. 

Following the plan agreed upon, the 



66 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

cadets of the military preparatory school 
of Tlalpam, a town near Mexico City, 
started out at 5 A. M. and reached the sta- 
tion of the electric railway, which they 
found deserted. It was arranged then 
that the section of cavalry should hasten 
towards San Antonio Abad, one of the 
gateways of Mexico City. There they 
were to wait for the rest of the column, 
which marched upon the Huipulco sta- 
tion, and commanded trains to carry it to 
the rendezvous; the column reformed it- 
self and marched upon the national 
palace, which it occupied without en- 
countering any resistance. Preparations 
were also made to occupy the towers of 
the cathedrals, and a detachment of 
cavalry rode off towards the Santiago 
Tlaltelolco jail to assist in liberating 
General Reyes. 

General Mondragon and Gregorio 
Ruiz, commanding another column which 
comprised the 1st cavalry and sections of 
the 2nd and 5th artillery with their can- 
non, left their quarters in Tacubaya 
bound for Mexico City via Chapultepec, 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 67 

where President Madero was at the time. 
When they passed Libertad Street they 
were joined by sections of the 1st artillery 
stationed there. They reached the mili- 
tary prison, where they found mounted 
cadets and men from the 20th infantry 
commanded by General Reyes, who had 
been freed without difficulty. 

The revolutionary corps then proceeded 
towards the penitentiary, from which they 
delivered Brigadier- General Felix Diaz 
without any bloodshed; some time was 
consumed, however, in parleying with the 
warden, who yielded only when the rebels 
threatened to shell the prison. 

General Reyes and Diaz embraced each 
other cordially and took command of the 
rebels, cheered loudly by the soldiers and 
by the crowds which had been amassing. 

The column in battle formation made 
for the national palace, but met with a 
bitter disappointment when approaching 
the building. 

The first person to hear of the uprising 
was Gustavo Madero, who, accompanied 
by several friends, hastened towards the 



68 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

palace in an automobile. Xo sooner had 
he arrived there than he found himself a 
prisoner in the hands of the cadets who a 
short while before had captured General 
Angel Garcia Pena, minister of war. 

General Lauro Villar, military com- 
mander of Mexico City, was informed of 
the disturbance directly after the sur- 
render of the palace. He went to the 
palace, apostrophized the guard valiantly, 
persuaded it to obey his orders, and took 
as his prisoners the cadets who didn't dare 
to shoot at the heroic veteran. He at once 
organized the defense of the palace. 

A few minutes later General Gregorio 
Ruiz, preceding General Reyes's column, 
appeared at the head of two squadrons of 
cavalry ready to lend assistance to the 
cadets. General Villar accompanied by 
Messrs. Baso and Salazar, first and 
second superintendents of the palace, met 
general Ruiz and ordered him to sur- 
render, while the two other men leveled 
their guns point-blank at the breast of 
the rebel chief, who, unable to resist, 
complied with the order. 



THE CA^E OP MEXICO 69 

Generals Reyes and Diaz advanced 
then at the head of their columns in total 
ignorance of what had just taken place. 
General Manuel M. Velasquez went to 
tell them that the palace had been retaken 
by the government, and advised them to 
change their plans accordingly. General 
Reyes, always haughty and ready to play 
his all on one card, disregarded that judi- 
cious advice and advanced against the 
troops defending the position. General 
Villar stopped him, ordering him to sur- 
render, and General Reyes, according to 
the accepted version of the incident, fired 
at him. This fact, however, is denied by 
several witnesses to the incident. One 
positive fact is that some one shot at Gen- 
eral Reyes, who fell dead with a bullet 
through his skull. At the same time the 
forces within the palace opened a brisk 
fire with rifles and machine guns, mow- 
ing down the assailants and a mob of 
men, women and children, who, attracted 
by their curiosity, were crowding the 
large square in front of the palace. The 
number of innocent bystanders thus 



70 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

killed was over eight hundred, while fully 
as many more were injured. 

This untoward development demoral- 
ized for a while the rebel column. Gen- 
erals Diaz and Mondragon held a brief 
conference ; they decided not to train their 
artillery on the palace on account of the 
terrible damage it would inflict upon the 
city; they retreated towards the Agri- 
cultural School, then, changing their 
minds while on their way there, finally 
marched on the Citadel, where they could 
secure a large supply of arms and ammu- 
nition. 

The troops occupying the Citadel re- 
sisted for twenty minutes, but capitulated 
at one o'clock in the afternoon. When 
the rebel forces, which we will henceforth 
designate as the Felixists, made their ^ 
triumphal entrance several officers were 
taken prisoners; among them was Gen- 
eral Davila, a member of the court- 
martial extraordinary which had sen- 
tenced General Felix Diaz to death. Da- 
vila unbuckled his sword and offered it to 
General Diaz, who said to him: 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 71 

"Keep your sword, comrade. I shall 
grasp with much pleasure the hand that 
signed my death sentence in Vera Cruz." 

And he actually shook hands with him 
and spared his life as well as that of the 

other prisoners. 

* * * 

President Madero was informed by 
telephone of the happenings in the capi- 
tal, and a little after 7 A. M. left the 
Castle of Chapultepec. On his way to 
the national palace he rode a white horse 
and was escorted by a group of cadets of 
the Military College and a few Chapul- 
tepec foresters. He was serene and 
smiling, and, as was his custom, greeted 
with a great display of cordiality every 
one he met. His escort prevailed upon 
him to stop and take refuge in a pho- 
tographer's studio opposite the National 
Theatre while they would find out what 
was happening. He was met there by 
several members of his familv, some of 
his ministers and General Victoriano 
Huerta. 

A little later it was decided to resume 



72 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

the march towards the palace, and the 
president, with his everlasting smile on 
his lips, rode through the large square 
over the victims of the savage butchery 
ordered by one of his officers. 

"On his arrival at the national palace," 
writes Jose Fernandez Rojas in his 
"Mexican Revolution," "Madero was ap- 
prised by General Villar of the situation; 
a cabinet council was held at once in 
which only Hernandez, Ernesto Madero, 
General Angel, Garcia Pena, and the en- 
gineer Manuel Bonilla took part. It is- 
sued the following orders : 

"1. That General Gregorio Ruiz be 
put to death at once without trial. 

"2. That the legislature be directed to 
extend the powers of the executive over 
the finance and war departments. 

"3. That General Victoriano Huerta 
be made military commander of the capi- 
tal. ( General Villar had been wounded. ) 

"Those orders were carried out at once 
and General Ruiz was shot in the yard of 
the palace, displaying to the end marvel- 
ous courage and himself giving the order 



^-." 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 73 

to the soldiers to fire. He was not al- 
lowed to write his will nor to send a line 
of farewell to his family. 

"That act assumed all the features of 
an atrocious political assassination for 
which Madero and the four ministers 
mentioned above will be held responsible 
by history. The law of suspension of 
guarantees could not be applied in the 
Federal district, and General Ruiz should 
have been tried by a competent court 
with full knowledge of his case." (Op. 
cit.) 

We may add that General Ruiz, being 
a representative to the National Con- 
gress, enjoyed thereby legislative im- 
munity and could not stand trial unless 
the House of which he was a member had 
impeached him. 

With him several of the young cadets 
made prisoners in the palace were also 
shot to death. 

It is imperative to bear all these facts 
in mind in order to pass an impartial 
judgment upon the administration of 
President Francisco I. Madero. 



CHAPTER IV 



CONTINUATION OF THE BLOODY TEN DAYS 

THE OPTIMISTIC AND IRRESPONSIBLE 

MADERO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS — 

THE MISSION OF THE SENATE — GEN- 
ERAL VICTORIANO HUERTA THE DI- 
LEMMA IN WHICH HE FOUND HIMSELF 

THE DECISION TAKEN BY GENERAL 

HUERTA AND THE ARMY THE FALL 

OF MADERO. 

On the evening of the same Sunday, 
which was the 9th of February, President 
Madero motored to Cuernavaca accom- 
panied by some of his trusted friends, 
ostensibly seeking General Angeles, al- 
though the latter could have been reached 
just as easily by telegram. It became 
known, however, that Madero's inten- 
tion, when he undertook that trip, was to 
conclude arrangements with the governor 
of the State of Moreles, Patricio Leyva, 
who was in his turn to negotiate with 
the Zapata brothers in regard to the plan 
of campaign to be adopted against Gen- 
eral Diaz. 

74 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 76 

There is not the slightest doubt but that 
President Madero always protected the 
Zapatist movement. He did it at first, 
as I have mentioned elsewhere, for the 
purpose of holding in check the pro- 
visional government of de la Barra, and 
later for purely sordid reasons. 

Fernandez Rojas (Loc, Cit.) , echoing 
the current opinion, states that the exist- 
ence of Zapatism in the prosperous State 
of Morelos "had only one meaning for 
the Madero family; by keeping that 
region in a constant state of hostility it 
was possible to lower considerably the 
value of real estate, and as the land- 
owners were unable to protect their in- 
terests in Morelos, the Madero family 
found itself in a position to acquire 
valuable sugar plantations in that State 
at a ridiculously low price." 

To sustain his statement that Madero 
and Zapata were working in accord to 
maintain a state of hostility in Morelos, 
Rojas cites the following facts which are 
unanimously admitted: 

"1. Madero was always opposed to the 



76 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

annihilation of Zapatism, which could not 
have resisted General Huerta's energetic 
methods of warfare. 

"2. The engineer Patricio Leyva owed 
his elevation to the highest dignity of the 
State to an electoral fraud abetted by the 
Center to the end that the government 
and Zapata be kept in close contact 
through the intermediary of Patricio 
Leyva himself. 

"3. The ordinance used by the Za- 
patists came, like that used by the army, 
from the national arsenal." 

Madero spent only a few hours in Cuer- 
navaca ; he returned to the capitol as hur- 
riedly as he had left it, and reached 
Mexico City on the morning of the 10th, 
displaying more confidence than ever in 
the final outcome of the struggle. A few 
hours later General Angeles, followed by 
a column of over a thousand men, arrived. 

I shall not describe in detail the revo- 
lution which for ten days made the capi- 
tal of the Republic a scene of terror and 
desolation. During that time Madero 
retained his optimism, assuring Mexico 



THE CASE OF MEXICX) 77 

and the world that in a few hours he 
would subdue the rebels holding the ci- 
tadel, although they were masters of the 
situation and had the support of the whole 
country. The inspired press sent out 
every day extravagant appeals for help 
for the government, and incited the 
people to rise against the cultured classes 
and the high interests. Pamphlets were 
circulated which brimmed over with 
threats and misleading information. Day 
after day people were shot without trial, 
simply on suspicion. 

This situation alarmed the diplomats, 
who felt called upon to proffer their 
services in order to end a warfare waged 
in the streets of the Mexican capital in 
which the majority of victims were non- 
combatants. The American ambassador 
and the ministers plenipotentiaries for 
Spain and Germany conferred with 
President Madero and offered their serv- 
ices to bring about through diplomatic 
channels an agreement with the Felixists. 
Madero answered with a smile that he 
would surely dominate the situation within 



78 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

twenty-four hours, or, at the utmost, 
thirty-six hours, for the citadel would fall 
as soon as Colonel Rubio Navarrete 
would assume control of the artillery. 
Thereupon the diplomats betook them- 
selves to the citadel and conferred with 
General Diaz, who recognized the gravity 
of the situation and explained that he was 
powerless to cope with it, for it had been 
created by the government. He would 
confine himself, he added, to defensive 
action, and expressed his earnest desire 
to avoid, as far as possible, further 
calamities. 

News was received from the United 
States which caused a good deal of con- 
sternation. It was rumored that an 
American army of thirty-five thousand 
men was ready to enter Mexico; that ten 
warships were in readiness to sail from 
Guantanamo bound for Mexican ports, 
and that four thousand marines would be 
landed any minute from the cruisers 
anchored off Vera Cruz, and would 
march on the capital. 

Then it was that President Madero 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 79 

cabled on the 14th to President Taft ex- 
plaining to him the situation in Mexico, 
and stating that the trouble would be over 
in a few hours, for the rebels had suffered 
considerable losses and were entirely de- 
moralized. There was not a word of 
truth in that dispatch; but Madero, ir- 
responsible as ever, had no doubt as to the 
final outcome. 

On the 16th, President Taft tele- 
graphed his answer explaining that what- 
ever measures he had taken were simply 
measures of precaution; he denied having 
ordered the landing of marines; he con- 
sidered it useless to renew the assurance 
of his friendly feelings towards Mexico 
after the United States had shown for 
two years its patience and good will; on 
account of the special friendship and of 
the relations uniting the two countries, 
however, he could not emphasize too much 
the vital importance for Madero to re- 
store peace and order, which the Ameri- 
can government hoped to see firmly 
established in Mexico. 

The message ended with a significant 



80 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

warning. President Taft added in con- 
clusion that as far as the anxiety ex- 
pressed by Madero in his despatch was 
concerned, he considered it his duty to 
state, sincerely and unreservedly, that the 
events of the past two years which had 
just culminated in a most ominous state 
of affairs were creating a very unfavor- 
able impression in the United States, and 
had convinced many that the most im- 
perious duty of the hour was to relieve the 
suspense. 

Francisco L. de la Barra, who had 
served as provisional president at the fall 
of President Diaz, endeavored to act as 
mediator, and had several confidential 
talks with President Madero, giving him 
to understand the danger with which the 
situation was freighted, and advising him 
to compromise with the revolutionists. 
The most Madero ever conceded was to 
authorize de la Barra to inquire about the 
demands of the Felixists. De la Barra 
then went to the citadel to confer with 
General Diaz, who manifested his willing- 
ness to end the hostilities on the sole con- 




FELIX DIAZ 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 81 

dition that the president, Vice-President 
Pino Suarez, and the members of the 
cabinet tender their resignation. De la 
Barra called once more on Madero, who, 
after hearing what the Felixists expected, 
answered curtly that he would never re- 
sign, and that nothing but death could 
remove him from the presidency, for he 
represented legality. 

The following is a resume of the situa- 
tion as it appeared to an eye witness : 

"The officers, fighting under the orders 
of General Huerta, were hostile to the 
government; so were the various com- 
manders of the army corps and their 
soldiers, who were being sacrificed in pro- 
tracted and sterile campaigns, and were 
beginning to feel a deep hatred for this 
ruler whom the press represented as a 
ridiculous personage, and whose ad- 
versary reminded them of the famous 
chief Porfirio Diaz. 

"Only the rurales, who were dispatched 
to the slaughter house column after 
column, were faithful to the government. 



82 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

bought as they were by the honors 
showered upon their chiefs. 

"General Huerta felt the terrible 
pressure of the hostility which all his sub- 
ordinates manifested towards the govern- 
ment; at the same time he remembered 
all the calumnies slung at him and the 
efforts made to exile him by the very man 
for whom many army officers, his friends, 
were fighting among themselves. He 
was unable, however, to take any radical 
decision, for the government distrusted 
him openly. 

"On two occasions General Huerta 
was to be arrested, but both times Presi- 
dent Madero was prevailed upon not to 
confirm the order he had given orally. 

"The diplomatic corps contributed to 
aggravate the position of the men who 
surrounded Francisco I. Madero. The 
notes sent by the foreign ministers and 
by friendly governments asked more in- 
sistently from day to day for a rapid so- 
lution of the difficulties. 

"More and more complaints were 
pouring every day into the national 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 88 

palace from those whose property was 
destroyed in the course of the artillery 
duel that was taking place. 

"It was idle to expect any action on the 
part of Parliament, for the anti-govern- 
mental deputies had fled the capital to 
avoid being shot ; and Madero's partisans, 
fearful of the consequences which any 
personal action might bring upon their 
heads, also remained in hiding. 

"The members of the Senate were 
equally inactive, for they realized that 
they could not cope with the situation 
without the help of the Chamber." ("The 
Bloody Ten Days," by Gonzalo N. 
Espinosa, Joaquin Pina y Carlos R. 
Ortiz.) 

In the face of such deplorable and 
hopeless conditions and in the face of in- 
evitable intervention by the United 
States, a group of senators met on the 
14th at the house of Senator Sebastien 
Camacho: Emilio Rabasa, Rafael Pi- 
mentel, Tomas R. Macmanus, Carlos 
Aguirre, Francisco L. de la Barra, Vic- 
tor Manuel Castillo, Luis C. Curiel, 



84 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

Juan C. Fernandez, Jesus Flores Ma- 
gon, Ricardo Guzman, and Guillermo 
Obregon. After lengthy deliberations 
they decided to call on the military com- 
mander General Huerta and advise him 
to ask President Madero for his formal 
resignation, inasmuch as this seemed to 
be the only possible solution of the prob- 
lem. Their resolution, however, was not 
carried out, for just at that time 
Premier Pedro Lascurain sent to Sena- 
tor Sebastian Camacho the following 
communication : 

"Acting upon directions of the presi- 
dent of the Republic, I have the honor of 
asking you to call a secret session extra- 
ordinary of the Senate, at which the 
executive will address you in regard to 
the present situation. Kindly inform me 
of the time at which the honorable sena- 
tors will meet in their chamber to the end 
that due safety be assured to them and 
that the undersigned secretary of state be 
able to attend and to address you in be- 
half of the executive." 

I consider it necessary to reproduce 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 86 

here in its entirety a most important 
historical document, the report of the 
secret session of the Senate held the fol- 
lowing day, the 15th of February. 

After the minutes were read the secre- 
tary of foreign aflPairs, the Honorable 
Pedro Lascurain, took the floor to ad- 
dress the assembly. The Honorable Las- 
curain declared that the Mexican situa- 
tion was extremely delicate from the 
point of view of international relations 
and in particular from the point of view 
of the relations with the United States; 
he said that telegrams had been received 
from Washington revealing the decision, 
already partly carried out, of the Ameri- 
can government to send warships and 
transports with landing forces into the 
Mexican waters of the Gulf and the Pa- 
cific. The honorable secretary of foreign 
affairs added that at one o'clock that 
morning the ambassador from the United 
States had asked several members of the 
diplomatic corps to come and confer with 
him at his embassy, informing them of the 
impending arrival of the ships and ex- 



86 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

pressing firmly the opinion that 3,000 
marines should be sent to Mexico City to 
protect the lives and interests of the 
American and other foreign residents. 
"There is no time to lose," the Honorable 
Lascurain said in conclusion; "every 
minute counts, and in view of the immin- 
ence of a foreign intervention with which 
we are threatened, I call upon the Senate 
to adopt for the sake of the country 
measures calculated to avert that danger." 
Invited by the vice-president to relate 
the facts which had come to his knowledge 
while he was acting as mediator. Senator 
de la Barra said that on Monday, the 10th 
instant, he had written to the president of 
the Republic placing himself at his dis- 
posal as a possible mediator, if he could 
be of any service in this grave conjunc- 
ture ; the president had answered that let- 
ter at midnight, stating that the govern- 
ment was not inclined to treat with the 
rebels in the citadel. On Friday, the 
14th, General Angeles called at the resi- 
dence of Senator de la Barra, inviting 
him in behalf of the president to go and 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 87 

confer with him at the national palace; a 
conference took place at which he was en- 
trusted with the mission of going to the 
citadel and discussing with the revolution- 
ary leaders the possibility of a three-day 
truce, during which a possible solution 
might be agreed upon for the present 
situation, so as to stave off, above all 
things, the danger of intervention on the 
part of a foreign power, which might be- 
gin to land troops to protect its subjects 
and the other foreigners residing in the 
capital. 

Senator de la Barra said that he dis- 
charged his mission but failed to obtain 
favorable results for the revolutionary 
leaders. Messrs. Diaz and Mondragon 
refused to accept the proposed armistice 
and to negotiate on any basis except the 
resignation of the president, vice-presi- 
dent and secretaries of state; the senator 
reported his findings to the president of 
the Republic; he considered then that his 
mission was at an end, but remained at 
the disposal of the first magistrate, ready 
to render any service that might con- 



88 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

tribute to re-establish the peace of the na- 
tion. 

Senator de la Barra added for the bene- 
fit of the senators who were not informed 
of that fact, that the vice-president of the 
Senate had called to the house of Sebas- 
tien Camacho all the senators who could 
be reached by telephone. The call for 
that meeting was explained by the note of 
the secretary of foreign affairs mentioned 
above; the meeting did not begin its de- 
liberations until the secretary of foreign 
affairs had appeared and made a detailed 
report upon the gravity of the situation, 
especially in regard to the attitude of the 
American government. It was decided 
that a call be sent out for a meeting of 
the whole Senate for the present meeting, 
as the group which convened at Senator 
Camacho's did not have the necessary au- 
thority to make its decisions respected, an 
authority which only a majority of the 
senators located at the time in the Federal 
District possessed. 

The Honorable Senator Valdivieso 
moved that a commission be appointed to 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 89 

suggest measures to be adopted by the 
Senate. 

The Honorable Senator Jose Diego 
Fernandez declared that considering the 
gravity of this situation, he was opposed 
to the preparation of a commission report 
and to the usual procedure. The Senate 
should approve at once without waste of 
time the following resolutions: 

First. — Resolved that the president of 
the Republic shall be advised, in view of 
the supreme necessity of saving the na- 
tional sovereignty, to tender his resigna- 
tion from his high office. 

Second. — That the same procedure be 
followed in regard to the vice-president of 
the Republic. 

Third. — That a commission be ap- 
pointed to apprise President Madero and 
Vice-President Pino Suarez of the deci- 
sions arrived at. 

The honorable secretary of foreign 
affairs moved that all the senators present 
betake themselves to the national palace 
to apprise Messrs. Madero and Pino 



90 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

Suarez of the decisions taken. The mo- 
tion was carried unanimously. 

Senator Rabaza nominated as spokes- 
man of the senators present Senator 
Gumersindo Enriquez. 

The Honorable Enriquez moved that 
Senator Diego Fernandez be selected as 
spokesman. Senator Rabaza moved that 
both Senator Enriquez and Senator 
Diego Fernandez be appointed spokes- 
men, no other senator besides them to be 
authorized in any way to speak in behalf 
of the Senate. This motion and the pre- 
ceding ones were carried unanimously. 

The twenty-five senators betook them- 
selves to the national palace accompanied 
by the secretary of foreign affairs, who 
went at once to the office of the president 
to inform President Madero that the 
Senate desired to apprise him of im- 
portant decisions it had taken. The 
senators waited half an hour or so in the 
room assigned to them. They were then 
admitted into one of the ante-rooms of 
the president's office where, after a wait 
of twenty-five minutes, they were met by 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 91 

the Honorable Ernesto Madero, former 
secretary of finances, the Honorable 
Manuel Bonilla, secretary of public 
works, the Honorable Jaime Gurza, sec- 
retary of communications, and the Hon- 
orable Pedro Lascurain, secretary of 
foreign affairs. The secretary of finances 
informed the senators that the president 
of the Republic had left twenty minutes 
before accompanied by General Garcia 
Pena, to visit the military positions of the 
government ; that he himself and the other 
secretaries of state could not represent 
the first magistrate or speak in his behalf ; 
he considered himself justified, however, 
in informing the senators that the gov- 
ernment had sufficient resources to 
dominate the situation, for it had received 
important reinforcements; the citadel 
would be retaken within a few days, for 
Brigadier- General Felix Diaz did not 
dispose of enough troops to resist the gov- 
ernment victoriously; the situation of the 
Republic in general was satisfactory, for 
no uprising had taken place in the States ; 
the State of Puebla had remained faith- 



92 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

ful, and it was said that Colonel Pradilla 
had taken charge of it in the capacity of 
military commander; he did not consider 
seriously the eventuality of an American 
intervention; the president was expecting 
an answer to a cablegram which he had 
sent to President Taft, a cablegram 
which he read to the senators and in which 
President Madero was asking President 
Taft to revoke the order for the dispatch 
of warships and of landing troops ; it was 
necessary to wait for the answer, as 
President Madero could be trusted to do 
everything which patriotism would de- 
mand; the resignation of the first magis- 
trate tendered at this time would only 
have dire results, for it would un- 
doubtedly be followed by a state of 
anarchy; according to information re- 
ceived, uprisings would take place at 
once in seven or eight of the States; 
ninety per cent, of the nation, including 
the privileged classes, stood with the 
president, the remaining ten per cent, be- 
ing only made up of politicians belonging 
to the opposition. 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 93 

The Honorable Gurza, minister of 
communications, annomiced that he had 
received telegrams from every State, on 
the strength of which he could affirm that 
the situation was perfectly satisfactory. 

Senator Enriquez, addressing himself 
to the minister of fmances, said: "Mr. 
Minister, speaking in behalf of the sena- 
tors here assembled who have done Sena- 
tor Diego Fernandez and myself the 
honor to designate us as their spokesmen, 
I beg you to tell us whether the president 
of the Republic is not going to receive us 
when twenty-five of us senators have 
come to him to inform him of most im- 
portant decisions we have taken under 
the most serious and most painful cir- 
cumstances of our country's life. You 
have told us that the president was out 
and had gone to inspect the advance mili- 
tary posts of the line investing the citadel ; 
you have not told us, however, whether he 
would receive us later, and you have given 
us no information on the situation in the 
country at large and in the capital in par- 



94 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

ticular ; in order to do this you would have 
to confer with the president." 

The minister answered that the presi- 
dent had left twenty minutes before, hav- 
ing gone out with General Garcia Pena 
for the reasons previously mentioned. 

Senator Enriquez added: "If the presi- 
dent does not intend to receive us and if 
it is to his ministers that we will have to 
explain the reasons which caused us to 
solicit an audience from the incumbent of 
the executive power, I consider it as my 
duty to make the following statements. 
The president invited the Senate through 
the Department of Foreign Affairs to 
meet in a session extraordinary for the 
purpose of hearing a report made by the 
relevant secretary upon grave news re- 
ceived relative to the sending of warships 
by the United States of America to the 
port of Vera Cruz with orders to land 
armed forces which would march upon the 
capital of Mexico to protect, if necessary, 
the interests and the life of Americans re- 
siding in our country. It was impossible 
to obtain a quorum yesterday when only 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 96 

twelve senators were present, and to-day 
when only twenty-five met in the cham- 
ber; this body, although it did not 
assume the character of a Senate, heard 
a report of Minister Lascurain which 
produced the deepest impression, and a 
report from Mr. de la Barra upon the 
unsuccessful negotiations he had con- 
ducted by request of the president of the 
Republic with the rebels occupying the ci- 
tadel, with the object of declaring an 
armistice and appointing a peace com- 
mission; after hearing those reports the 
senators came to an unanimous con- 
clusion (there are with us now three 
dissenting members, the Honorable Ma- 
galoni, Gomez and Tagle, but they were 
not present at the meeting in which we 
took the decisions I will now mention) : 
It was resolved that the president, vice- 
president, and members of the cabinet 
should resign their high offices, obeying 
thereby the highest patriotic considera- 
tions; without that act of abnegation on 
their part, considering the attitude of the 
rebels as pictured to us by Mr. de la 



96 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

Barra, there could not be any hope for 
peace. It was further resolved that the 
senators present at that meeting should 
call upon the president in a body and in- 
form him of their decisions, which had 
been inspired by the purest patriotism 
and the most sincere confidence that the 
first magistrate of the nation is still ani- 
mated by the spirit of which he has given 
so many proofs. 

"Having come to this place, Mr. 
Minister, we face the fact that we cannot 
address ourselves directly to the president 
to discharge our mission; and the only 
thing left to us is to ask you to explain to 
the first magistrate the object of the call 
which the senators present have paid on 
him. Tell him how sorry we are not to 
have been able to relate to him personally 
the resolutions we passed at the meeting 
called through the Department of For- 
eign Affairs; teU him also how earnestly 
this body of senators beg him to render 
to his country the service which they ex- 
pect of him, a service which will redound 
to his glory and entitle him to the grati- 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 97 

tude of posterity. For it is not only on 
the battlefield and through bloodshed 
that one acquires glory and fame; the 
country can be served more efficiently 
through an act of sublime self-renuncia- 
tion such as we expect from him, and for 
which the country is anxiously waiting. 

"Our attitude, Mr. Minister, has not 
been modified by the information that you 
have kindly given us upon the general 
situation of the country, and upon the 
armed strife which is taking place in 
our capital. It is not those various inci- 
dents which have prompted us to take 
such a step, but the fear of complications 
with the United States, which are likely 
to jeopardize our national independence; 
this is a danger before which all selfish 
considerations must be laid aside, and the 
most legitimate rights must be waived, 
for the interests of the country must be 
held above all human considerations." 

The Honorable Diego Fernandez took 
the floor to declare himself in entire sym- 
pathy with the sentiments expressed by 
Senator Enriquez. 



98 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

The meeting adjourned. 
* * * 

The senators did not give up their 
patriotic purpose, and after many meet- 
ings and many useless attempts at con- 
ferring with President Madero they were 
at last received by him on the morning of 
Tuesday, the 18th. To every one of their 
remonstrances he answered that under no 
consideration would he ever resign; he 
would rather be the president of a people 
of corpses and of a nation in ruins, rather 
than tender his resignation^ he said, for he 
represented legality. 

The senators withdrew from that con- 
ference convinced that there was nothing 
to be expected from Madero, and they de- 
cided upon a final step. They went to the 
office of the military commander and 
called on General Huerta, trying to 
overcome his scruples. Huerta once 
more denied their request. In taking 
leave of him the senators told him that 
they had at last the satisfaction of having 
done all there was in their power to stop 
the useless shedding of blood, and that 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 99 

history would judge whether the army 
had done right or wrong in supporting a 
man who had cost his country so many 
Hves. The only alternative for the army, 
they said in conclusion, was faithfulness 
to Madero, or faithfulness to the country. 

These last words impressed the old 
soldier so deeply that, as the senators 
were leaving him, he detained them a 
while and said: 

"Well, gentlemen, I too am greatly 
worried over the conditions that prevail in 
our country. I have already told you 
that I cannot strike such a blow as you 
mention, but I could refuse to recognize 
President Madero if directed to do so by 
the legislative and judicial powers. You 
may confer with the men invested with 
judicial power, and if the two bodies agree 
I will consider it proper to tell President 
Madero that he must resign at once." 

The senators withdrew, to return soon 
afterwards accompanied by a majority of 
the justices of the Supreme Court; the 
latter assured General Huerta that they 



100 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

were agreeable to the proposition made 
by the members of the legislature. 

General Huerta conferred at once with 
his subordinates, and finding that two of 
them. Generals Felipe Angeles and Jose 
Delgado were not in accord with him, he 
excluded them from the conference and 
later placed them under arrest. 

General Huerta gave orders to Gen- 
eral Aureliano Blanquet, a valiant and 
trusted man, to take possession of the na- 
tional palace with the 29th battalion, of 
which he was commander, after which he 
ordered Lieutenant- Colonel RiveroU and 
Major Izquierdo to go to the presidential 
palace, where Madero and the members 
of his cabinet were at the time, and to re- 
quest him respectfully in behalf of the 
Legislature and the Army to tender his 
resignation. What took place then is re- 
lated as follows by Adjutant Fernando 
Troncoso of the military commander's 
staff, who was an eye witness of the scene : 

"Ex-President Madero was seated with 
several members of his cabinet in one of 
the parlors of the palace when Lieuten- 




GENERAL AURELIANO BLANQUET 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 101 

ant-Colonel RiveroU appeared before him 
asking him, in behalf of the Senate and 
the Army, for his immediate resignation. 
Madero listened to his words, then took a 
revolver and fired at the unfortunate offi- 
cer, who fell on the floor, never to rise 
again; thereupon Major Izquierdo ap- 
peared and was also shot dead by Captain 
Garmendia. The president, accompanied 
by several people, took the elevator, and 
when he reached the main entrance to the 
palace, seeing the armed forces standing 
in front of it, he exclaimed: 

"Here is the president of the Republic, 
gentlemen." 

The valiant General Blanquet, revolver 
in hand and leading the greater part of 
his battalion, marched towards Presi- 
dent Madero and, ordering that no shot 
be fired, took him prisoner. What hap- 
pened afterwards is known to everybody. 

Ernesto Madero, minister of finance, 
and Jaime Curza, minister of communica- 
tions, escaped in the disorder that fol- 
lowed. Rafael Hernandez, minister of 
state, was freed on parole. President 



102 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

Madero, Vice-President Pino Suarez, 
and the other ministers were held prison- 
ers in various rooms in the basement of 
the palace, guarded by sentinels. 

The bells of every church in the capital 
were tolled to announce Madero' s fall, 
and every class of the population received 
the news with undisguised pleasure. 

General Huerta sent out at once the 
following manifesto, which was circu- 
lated broadcast : 

"To THE Mexican People: 

"In view of the difficult circumstances 
under which the nation, and within the 
last days, the capital of the Republic 
have labored, in view of what I may call 
the state of anarchy due to the incapable 
government of Mr. Madero, I hereby 
assume the executive power. Until the 
Houses of the Union can meet and de- 
bate upon the present situation I shall 
hold Francisco I. Madero and the mem- 
bers of his cabinet, to the end that this 
point being settled and every effort made 
to unite all the minds in this historical 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 108 

moment, we may all work together to re- 
establish peace, which for our nation is a 
question of life and death. 

Issued in the Executive Palace, Feb- 
ruary 18, 1913. 

The General Military Commander in 
charge of the Executive Power. 

V. Hueeta/^ 



CHAPTER V 

THE PACT or THE CITADEL THE RESIGNA- 
TION OF PRESIDENT MADERO AND VICE- 
PRESIDENT PINO SUAREZ THE ORIGIN 

OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 

THE DE FACTO GOVERNMENT BECOMES 
A GOVERNMENT DE JURE ACCORDING TO 
THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION. 

As soon as Madero and Pino Suarez 
were deposed, General Huerta consid- 
ered that the hostilities between the fed- 
eral forces and the Felixists should come 
to an end. His opinion was transmitted 
to General Felix Diaz, who agreed fully 
with him, since the revolt he had led had 
accomplished its purpose. Arrangements 
were made for a conference in which the 
two leaders would settle formally and 
definitely the present situation and decide 
upon the course to be followed in the im- 
mediate future. 

At eight o'clock of the same day 
(February 18) General Huerta went to 
the Department of State where Briga- 

104 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 105 

dier General Felix Diaz was awaiting him 
and the conference took place. General 
Huerta was accompanied by Lieutenant 
Colonel Joaquin Mass and Enrique Ce- 
peda, C. E. General Diaz had with him 
Rodolfe Reyes, Fidencio Hernandez, 
General Mondragon, and several of the 
officers who had fought with him in the 
Citadel. A protracted discussion on the 
question of merging the various political 
groups gave unsatisfactory results, as 
every one present expressed diverging 
opinions; the two leaders were the ones 
who spoke least. 

Finally some one suggested that in 
order to shorten the proceedings the two 
generals be left together to settle the 
question the best they could, with due re- 
gard to the interest of the nation. 

This advice was heeded and within a 
few minutes Huerta and Diaz found 
themselves in perfect accord; they called 
in their friends, informed them of the 
understanding they had arrived at and 
asked them to write down the following 
protocol : 



106 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

"In the city of Mexico, at nine-thirty 
in the evening, the 18th of February, 
1913, Generals Felix Diaz and Vic- 
toriano Huerta having met in conference, 
the former assisted by Messrs. Fidencio 
Hernandez and Rodolfo Keyes, the lat- 
ter by Lieutenant Colonel Joaquin Mass 
and Enrique Cepeda, General Huerta 
stated that the situation created by the 
government of Mr. Madero being un- 
bearable, he had, in order to prevent the 
further shedding of blood and to safe- 
guard national unity, placed under arrest 
said Madero, several members of his cab- 
inet, and various other persons; that he 
wished to express to General Diaz the 
sincere wish that the political elements 
General Diaz represented return into the 
fold, and that all parties at last reunited 
put an end to this deplorable situation. 
General Diaz stated that his only reason 
for raising the standard of revolt was a 
desire to protect the national welfare, 
and that he was ready to make any sacri- 
fice that would prove beneficial to the 
country. 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 107 

After a discussion in which the above 
mentioned gentlemen took part, the fol- 
lowing resolutions were agreed upon: 

1. The former incumbent of the 
Executive Power is not to be recognized 
henceforth, and the political forces rep- 
resented by Generals Diaz and Huerta 
are to unite in opposing all efforts to re- 
store him to power. 

2. The present situation shall be 
settled with the least possible delay and 
by the most convenient lawful means, 
and Generals Diaz and Huerta will do 
all in their power to enable the latter to 
assume within seventy-two hours the pro- 
visional presidency of the Republic with 
the following cabinet : 

Foreign affairs: Francisco Leon de la 
Barra. 

Finance: Toribio Esquivel Obregon. 

War: General Manuel Mondragon. 

Public Works: Alberto Robles Gil, 
C.E. 

State: Alberto Garcia Granados, C.E. 

Justice: Rodolfo Reyes. 

Education: Jorge Vera Estanol. 



108 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

Communications: David de la Fuente, 
C.E. 

A new department to be known as the 
department of agriculture shall be cre- 
ated with the purpose of preparing a so- 
lution of the agrarian questions and re- 
lated problems; the portfolio of this de- 
partment is to be held by Manuel Garza 
Aldape. 

Whatever changes may be introduced 
in the proposed cabinet shall be agreed 
upon in a way similar to the way the cab- 
inet itself was agreed upon. 

3. Until such time as the situation 
shall have been settled lawfully, Generals 
Huerta and Diaz shall remain the deposi- 
tories of all authority that is necessary to 
give full protection to all interests. 

4. General Diaz declines to be a mem- 
ber of the provisional cabinet when Gen- 
eral Huerta assumes the provisional 
presidency, so as to retain his entire free- 
dom of action, and to foster the interests 
of his party during the coming elections, 
an attitude he wishes to make very clear 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 109 

to everyone, and upon which the under- 
signed are fully agreed. 

5. An official note shall be sent at 
once to the representatives of foreign 
nations, mentioning solely that the in- 
cumbent of the executive power has been 
removed and that steps will be taken at 
once to select his successor, and that in 
the meantime Generals Diaz and Huerta 
shall exert all their authority to assure 
full protection to all foreign residents. 

6. All rebels shall be invited at once 
to cease hostilities, and all the cases shall 
be settled separately. 

General Victoriano Huerta 
General Felix Diaz 

Such is the document known to history 
as the "Pact of the Citadel", although it 
was concluded not in that edifice but in 
the department of state. 

General Huerta, who, until then, had 
only held the title of military commander 
in charge of the executive power, consti- 
tuted himself the official leader of the 
revolution. 



110 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

He sent through official channels to 
the dean of the diplomatic corps, Henry 
Lane Wilson, ambassador from the 
United States, a full account of all that 
had transpired. In that communication 
he stated that the only motive of his ac- 
tion had been patriotism, and that he was 
not actuated by any personal aims; that 
his only purpose was to reestablish peace 
in the republic and to safeguard the in- 
terests of foreigners. He also asked him 
to transmit this information to the Ameri- 
can government. 

The ambassador from the United 
States answered in his own name and in 
behalf of the diplomatic corps, ac- 
knowledging receipt of the note and its 
contents, and expressing the hope that 
General Huerta would invite all Mexi- 
cans without distinction to cooperate in 
his work of pacification. 

At the same time Mr. Wilson, in his 
official capacity of ambassador, sent an- 
other note to General Huerta stating 
that he had no intention of interfering in 
the national affairs of Mexico, but sug- 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 111 

gested discreetly that General Huerta 
and his army place themselves at the dis- 
posal of the Congress of the Union. He 
added that he would also broach the sub- 
ject to General Felix Diaz. 

General Huerta stated verbally to the 
bearers of those notes that he was fully 
conscious of his responsibilities and that 
his most earnest desire was to return as 
soon as possible to the life of a private 
citizen, and that as long as he would be 
vested with the supreme authority all 
foreigners could count on his friendship 
and protection. 

The next morning Generals Huerta 
and Diaz issued the following proclama- 
tion to the Mexican people: 

"The unbearable and perilous situa- 
tion which obtained in the capital caused 
the army represented by the imdersigned 
to cooperate fraternally in sa^dng our 
country, and in consequence of that ac- 
tion the nation can now rest in peace. 

"All the liberties compatible with order 
shall be guaranteed under the personal 
responsibility of the undersigned officers, 



112 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

who will assume henceforth the com- 
mandment and the reins of the govern- 
ment in so far as this will be necessary in 
order to give full protection to natives 
and foreigners, and who engage them- 
selves to settle the situation on a lawful 
basis within seventy-two hours. 

"The army exhorts the citizens to con- 
tinue in the noble attitude of respect and 
moderation which they have preserved to 
this day, and invites all the revolutionary 
bands to join hands for the purpose of es- 
tablishing permanent peace in the nation. 

"Mexico, February 18, 1913. 

Felix Diaz. V. Huerta." 

General Huerta's government became 
then a de facto government, and al- 
though this was quite sufficient for the 
time being, the new incumbent of the 
executive power considered it as impera- 
tive to comply at once with the constitu- 
tional provisions. He therefore ad- 
dressed the same day a message to the 
Federal Congress giving an account of 
the incidents that had taken place. Fol- 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 113 

lowing this the Chamber of Deputies met 
the same day (February 19) and remain- 
ed in session from four in the afternoon 
until eleven at night to discuss the resig- 
nation of President Madero and Vice- 
President Pino Suarez. 

The Chamber appointed a commission 
composed of Deputies Francisco de Ola- 
guibel, Francisco Escudero, and Jose I. 
Novelo, whose duty would be to call on 
Madero and Pino Suarez, detained in the 
National Palace, and to ask them to ten- 
der their resignation. 

The commission did not find - them 
readily amenable to reason; Madero re- 
peated with insistence that he represented 
legality. Finally Madero and Suarez 
yielded and tendered their resignation in 
a joint note which read: 

To the Honorable Secretaries of the 
Chamber of Deputies: 

In consideration of the events that took 
place yesterday in Mexico, and to insure 
the peace of the nation, we hereby form- 
ally resign the positions of president and 



114 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

vice-president to which we were respec- 
tively elected. We do this under protest. 

Mexico, February 19, 1913. 

Francisco I. Madero 
Jose M. Pino Suarez 

At 8.45 the chamber presented that 
document to the minister of foreign af- 
fairs, Pedro Lascurain. It was referred 
to the second committee on state affairs; 
and the third committee on constitutional 
questions, which issued almost immedi- 
ately the following orders : 

"1. That the resignation of the Honor- 
able Francisco I. Madero as President of 
the Republic be accepted. 

2. That the resignation of the Honor- 
able Jose M. Pino Suarez as Vice-Presi- 
dent of the Republic be accepted. 

3. That Pedro Lascurain, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, be called upon to oc- 
cupy, in virtue of his office, the position 
of provisional president. 

To be communicated to all the parties 
concerned." 

The order was approved in toto without 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 115 

discussion. When the items were put in 
discussion the resignation of Madero was 
approved by 123 votes against 4; that of 
Pino Suarez by 119 against 8. 

In consequence of which Pedro Las- 
curain was declared the constitutional 
provisional president of the Republic and 
took at once the oath of office. 

In the course of the same session a 
communication from the new provisional 
president was read; in this he informed 
the Chamber that he had appointed Gen- 
eral Huerta Minister of State. There- 
upon Mr. Lascurain tendered his resig- 
nation as provisional president. The 
relevant committees of the Chamber di- 
rected that his resignation be accepted 
and that General Huerta, minister of 
state, be called to assume, eoo officio, the 
vacant post. The order having been ap- 
proved by the Chamber, General Huerta 
took the oath of office at once and became 
henceforth de facto and de jure consti- 
tutional President of the United States of 
Mexico. 

The foregoing is ample evidence that 



116 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

General Huerta did not take the presi- 
dency by force and violence. He held 
the executive power in his hands for a few 
hours only in virtue of his position as 
commander of the army and in accordance 
with the Pact of the Citadel. He turned 
it over immediately, however, in obedience 
to the will of the Chamber of Deputies to 
the man who was, according to the consti- 
tution, its lawful incumbent. When he 
again assumed the power he did so in a 
perfectly constitutional way, authorized 
by a vote of the Chamber of Deputies 
convened in lawful meeting in confor- 
mity with the legal procedure governing 
such cases. 

This does away with the main objection 
which the government of the United 
States has raised to recognizing our pro- 
visional government. This objection is 
totally unfounded or rather the founda- 
tion upon which it reposes is either a mis- 
taken notion or a lie. 

The press of the United States has on 
several occasions expressed doubts as to 
whether Madero and Pino Suarez had 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 117 

actually tendered their resignations. I 
read very recently, on December 24, 1913, 
in the usually careful New York Times 
statements made by Mr. Frederick Im- 
man Monsen, from which I may quote the 
following lines: 

"No one knows," he said, "just when 
he was killed, except that it happened 
at night. After repeated refusals on the 
part of Madero to resign he was removed 
one night from his room and taken into 
an adjoining one, where his resignation 
was placed before him in writing. 

"A pen was put in his hand and he was 
asked to sign his name. He refused; 
whereupon the Mexican leader grasped 
the pen and shaking it in his face cried, *I 
will sign your name to this and, Madero, 
you shall never live to deny the signature.' 

"That night Madero and several of his 
advisers were killed." 

Mr. Monsen did not know of what he 
was talking. There is no proof that 
Huerta saw Madero, or asked him per- 
sonally for his resignation, or that Ma- 
dero was killed the night after he had re- 



118 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

signed (February 19) . He was killed on 
the night of the 22nd, that is three fuU 
days after he had tendered his resigna- 
tion; there is no proof that any of his ad- 
visers were killed that night. 
. It is regrettable that the sayings of 
persons who have neither the time nor 
the desire to ascertain the actual facts 
should find such an echo in the American 
press. It is still more deplorable that the 
government at Washington should lend 
an ear to reports of such a nature without 
making due efforts to verify their ac- 
curacy. 



CHAPTER VI 

GUSTAVO MADERO AND BASO ARE SEN- 
TENCED TO BE SHOT THE DEATH OF 

EX-PRESIDENT MADERO AND EX-YICE- 
PRESIDENT PINO SUAREZ. 

Gustavo Madero was said to be Fran- 
cisco Madero's favorite brother. Public 
opinion considered him as the power be- 
hind the throne, as the instigator of all the 
crimes perpetrated by the government; 
he was held responsible for every act of 
iniquity committed during the Maderist 
regime. His friends, on the contrary, pre- 
tended that more than once he quarrelled 
with Francisco over some of the latter' s 
frenzied doings, and that the president 
would have been much better off if he had 
followed some of his advice= I do not 
know which of these two views of Gus- 
tavo's character is the correct one; one 
fact, however, which cannot be gainsaid 
is that Gustavo was the organizer of the 
"Porra", the most odious and most funest 

119 



120 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

society ever started in Mexico, a sort of 
political black hand whose members were 
all visibly and efficiently protected by 
Gustavo Madero. 

Regarding the circumstances of Gus- 
tavo's arrest many romantic stories have 
been told. Some say that he was plan- 
ning to poison General Huerta at a ban- 
quet which he had prepared and which 
took place at the very time when he was 
arrested, "for the Madero family always 
managed to let their rejoicings coincide 
with scenes of national mourning." 

In fact the banquet took place on 
February 18, at the very hour when Presi- 
dent Madero was apprehended. 

Gustavo Madero was dining at the 
restaurant Gambrinus with Generals 
Jose Delgado, Agustin Sangines, and 
Colonel Francisco Romero, who had just 
been promoted to the rank of brigadier- 
general and in whose honor the banquet 
was given. Of a sudden Lieutenant Luis 
Fuentes, accompanied by an escort of 
Chapultepec foresters, appeared in the 
dining-room, and, addressing Gustavo 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 121 

Madero, informed him that he was under 
arrest. Gustavo tried to reach his pistol, 
but the officer foiled that attempt by 
pressing the muzzle of his revolver against 
Madero's forehead, and Madero sur- 
rendered. He was locked up in a cellar 
room of the restaurant, guarded by a sen- 
tinel, and sometime during the night he 
was taken to the National Palace amid 
expressions of hatred on the part of the 
crowd which had learned of the happen- 
ings and which would have lynched him if 
his escort hadn't protected him. 

At midnight he was removed from the 
Palace to the Citadel, and early the next 
morning was shot to death. 

The authors of the "Bloody Ten Days" 
relate this incident as follows: 

"The Felixists, occupying the fortress, 
became very excited when they saw that 
Gustavo Madero was in their power. 
The defenders of the fortress shouted, as 
the mob had shouted on the streets, de- 
manding the head of the prisoner to 
avenge the deaths of General Ruiz and of 



122 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

all the unfortunate victims who had been 
sacrificed in the battle waged the first day. 

"General Diaz denied his soldiers' de- 
mands, for his prisoner was absolutely un- 
strung, and shaking with fear at the 
thought of being put to death in the 
Felixist fortress. 

"As the prisoner was transferred from 
one part of the fortress to another an in- 
cident took place which still appears un- 
explainable, but which most people con- 
sider as a part of a premeditated plan. 

"As Gustavo Madero and his guards 
were crossing the small square where the 
statue of General Morelos stands, some- 
one, probably the adjutant to General 
Mondragon, fired a gun at Gustavo. The 
latter, hearing the report, tried to flee to 
shelter himself in one of the artillery 
wagons which stood near by; several 
soldiers, however, discharged their guns at 
the fugitive, who fell dead, having been hit 
and sent rolling on the ground by the first 
shot." 

The truth is that Gustavo as well as 
Adolfo Baso were sent to the Citadel to be 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 123 

shot. At 2 o'clock in the morning he was 
taken out of his cell by an officer leading 
a platoon of soldiers, but, on his way to 
the place of execution, he begged for 
mercy and in panicky terror cried out that 
he was only a civilian, that he had never 
mixed with politics, and offered all his 
fortune in exchange for his life. When he 
reached the small square in front of the 
Citadel, he tried to run away and the es- 
cort opened fire on him, shooting him 
through the back. 

The attendant of the Palace, Captain 
Adolf o Baso of the navy, was also taken 
from the Palace where he had been kept 
and removed to the Citadel. Baso was 
responsible for the terrible slaughter of 
the defenseless crowd which occurred in 
the first encounter before the Palace; he 
was the one who discharged the machine 
guns which produced that horrible but- 
chery. 

Baso left the fortress surrounded by 
the platoon that was to execute him and 
when reaching the small square said: 

"What are you going to do to me? 



124 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

Shoot me? Please notice that I am dying 
like a man. I want to look at the sky. 
... I can't see the Great Bear. . . . Oh, 
yes! there it is shining beautifully." 

He distributed a few trinkets among 
the soldiers, gave a few messages for his 
family and exclaimed : 

"I am 62. You see that I am dying 
like a man." 

And opening the large cape which he 
wore he threw out his chest and gave the 

order to fire. A volley mowed him down. 

* * * 

As soon as President Madero and Vice- 
President Pino Suarez were arrested 
there was much speculation as to the fate 
that awaited them. Both were the object 
of deep hatred; Pino Suarez more per- 
haps than Madero. Army officers and 
soldiers were in favor of their execution; 
the people were greatly incensed over the 
slaughter of harmless folk and the many 
executions that had taken place without 
process of law. The lives of both men 
were in great danger, and therefore the 
government decided to transfer them 




,f^ 









GENERAL M. MONDRAGON 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 125 

from the Palace to the penitentiary, 
where they would be safe against any at- 
tempt on the part of the mob or the army. 
This decision was agreed upon by Gen- 
erals Huerta, Diaz, Mondragon, and 
Blanquet, and Mr. Rodolfo Reyes. 

The press of Mexico City published on 
February 23 the following item: 

"The President of the Republic called 
a meeting of his cabinet at 12.30 p.m. to 
report that Messrs. Francisco I. Madero 
and Jose M. Pino Suarez, who were held 
in the National Palace at the disposition 
of the secretary of war, were being re- 
moved, according to the decision taken, to 
the penitentiary, which establishment had 
been placed, for more safety, under the 
command of an army officer; the automo- 
biles carrying them were only a short dis- 
tance from the penitentiary when they 
were stopped by a group of armed men; 
the men of the escort stepped out to de- 
fend themselves; the number of the ag- 
gressors increased and the prisoners tried 
to run away; a shooting affray took place 
in the course of which two of the aggres- 



126 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

sors were wounded and one killed and 
both prisoners lost their lives. 

"The president and his cabinet ordered 
the judicial authority to inquire into this 
attempt against the life of military pris- 
oners (as Mr. Madero and Mr. Pino 
Suarez were). A very thorough inquiry 
was conducted under the personal direc- 
tion of the military attorney general. 
The minister of justice has ruled that, 
considering the exceptional character of 
the case, the Attorney- General of the Re- 
public is to take up the case after the pre- 
liminary inquiry is terminated. 

"The government deplores this inci- 
dent; for more safety it had that evening 
asked the minister of justice to prepare 
the case against the prisoners for the fol- 
lowing Monday. As at that time sev- 
eral friends of Mr. Madero were endeav- 
oring to help in finding a solution for that 
difficult and delicate problem, the govern- 
ment, to protect itself and to protect its 
prisoners, had appointed Colonel Luis 
Ballesteros director of the penitentiary 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 127 

and given him very strict orders to be in 
readiness for any emergency. 

"The government promises that justice 
shall take its course. The officers com- 
manding the escort have been held and all 
the possible evidence is being collected. 
The whole truth shall be known regarding 
this disgraceful incident, which, however, 
is not unexplainable under the present 
painful circumstances." 

Major Francisco Cardenas of the 7th 
Rurales, who was in charge of the transfer 
of the prisoners, informed the press that a 
first attack had been made at Lecumberri 
Street upon the escort which found itself, 
a little later, confronted by a group of 
men who opened fire upon the automo- 
biles. Those men were in ambush only a 
few yards from the prison. The men who 
fired the first shots were lying flat in the 
gutter. 

"The prisoners tried to take advantage 
of the confusion and to run away. That 
attempt cost them their lives, for the men 
who had set out to free them (those who 
attacked the automobiles could not have 



128 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

had any other purpose) fired shots rather 
carelessly. The Rurales of the escort also 
discharged their guns in self defense. Mr. 
Madero and Pino Suarez fell down, prob- 
ably struck by bullets from both sides." 

Such is the official version. 

A different version was circulated, ac- 
cording to which the prisoners had been 
shot by their escort. The authors of the 
"Bloody Ten Days", whom I have quoted 
several times, give credence to the popu- 
lar version and add: "The news of Mr. 
Madero's death did not create much of an 
impression, nor did it cause any disturb- 
ance. A few people from the lowest 
classes and a few workingmen were the 
only ones to cheer Madero's body when it 
was removed from the penitentiary where 
the autopsy had been held." 

Carlos Toro in his book "The Fall of 
Madero" expressed himself as follows: 

"Let us say it quite frankly: nobody 
cared to preserve the lives of those dan- 
gerous apostles of violence and anarchy, 
and their death was considered by their 
friends and enemies alike as a national 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 129 

necessity. The bitterness, the anger, the 
feuds so sedulously kept up by those two 
men ended with them; it was plain com- 
mon sense that demanded their extermina- 
tion. There was plenty of deplorable 
evidence at hand that those men, in- 
capable of governing, were dangerous 
agitators. 

"Whether this was a genuine assault or 
a premediated execution, the nation's will 
was done. If a crime was committed it 
was a collective crime, for society was de- 
manding with insistence the suppression 
of the two men mainly responsible for the 
disorderly conditions affecting the Re- 
public." 

Jose Fernandez Rojas, in his "Mexi- 
can Revolution," writes: 

"That version (the official one) has not 
found general acceptance ; there is nothing 
incredible about it, however, and it is per- 
fectly within the limits of the possible. A 
group of Maderists may have tried to lib- 
erate their chief leader with the only re- 
sult that of satisfying the public's greatest 
need. 



130 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

"Madero's and Pino Suarez's deaths 
were essential to the welfare of the coun- 
try; it is a sorry thought, however, that 
only their tragic fate could have insured 
permanent peace for our country." 

Thus we find two contradictory reports. 
The first can be suspected on account of 
its official origin, for the government may 
have had an interest in misrepresenting 
the facts. The second is quite as sus- 
picious as the first, for it had no basis of 
fact and is little more than gossip told by 
one or several persons who had not wit- 
nessed the deed. 

It may be said in favor of the first ver- 
sion that the government did not have to 
resort to such stratagems in order to bring 
about the execution of Madero and Pino 
Suarez; it could have proceeded in their 
case as it did in the case of Gustavo Ma- 
dero and Baso; or it could have, in order 
to avoid responsibilities, sent them before 
a drum head court-martial which would 
have tried them summarily and ordered 
their immediate execution. Moreover, the 
case was referred to the relevant courts in 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 181 

order that a regular inquiry be held ; when 
the inquiry was completed, the court de- 
clared that no one could be held on ac- 
count of the shooting. From the point of 
view of the courts, the legal truth was 
therefore that no crime had been commit- 
ted and that the official version was the 
truthful one. 

I would like finally to add this : an an- 
onymous accuser, public opinion, charged 
the government with having assassinated 
Madero and Pino Suarez. When the case 
came to the courts, no one rose to sustain 
the charge, no one presented any evidence, 
except circumstantial evidence. What 
importance can one attach to such anony- 
mous accusations? 

The most one can do in this case is to 

suspend judgment; in the jurisprudence 

of all countries the defendant should be 

accorded the benefit of the doubt ; nowhere 

can any one be put in jeopardy for a deed, 

unless it has been demonstrated beyond 

cavil that the deed was committed and 

that the defendant was guilty of it. 
* * * 



132 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

I shall now sum up this first part of my 
book. I believe I have proved to my 
readers' satisfaction the following facts: 

1. That Francisco I. Madero was a 
disturber of the public peace and the 
leader of a revolution in which all the ills 
for which the Mexican Republic is now 
suffering had their inception. 

2. That Francisco I. Madero took con- 
trol of the presidency merely on the 
strength of the revolution. 

3. That Francisco I. Madero violated 
repeatedly the federal constitution and 
the election laws. 

4. That the administration of Fran- 
cisco I. Madero was positively disastrous 
for the country. 

5. That the counter revolution, or in 
other words, the movement directed 
against the Maderist administration, was 
a necessity created by the government it- 
self. 

6. That Francisco I. Madero was re- 
sponsible either directly or indirectly for 
the slaughter of peaceful people which 




GENERAL GREGORIO RUEZ 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 188 

went on in Mexico City during the 
Bloody Ten Days. 

7. That Francisco I. Madero was di- 
rectly responsible for the execution of 
General Gregorio Ruiz, Deputy to the 
Congress of the Union, without previous 
process of law, although the constitutional 
guaranties had not been suspended in the 
federal district and General Ruiz was 
covered by his parliamentary immunity. 

8. That Francisco I. Madero killed 
with his own hand Lieutenant Colonel 
Teodoro Jiminez RiveroU when the latter 
presented himself before him, in compli- 
ance with his superior's orders, to ask him 
respectfully to tender his resignation. 

9. That there is no legal proof, but 
merely a chain of circumstantial evidence 
to sustain the charge that General Huerta 
ordered the assassination of Francisco I. 
Madero and of Jose Pino Suarez. If the 
declarations of the government are not 
sufficient one must either produce evi- 
dence or suspend judgment, and in case 
of doubt no sentence can be passed. 

It may be fitting to repeat here what I 



134 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

wrote in the concluding paragraph of the 
preceding chapter: "This does away with 
the main objection which the government 
of the United States has raised to recog- 
nizing our provisional government. This 
objection is totally unfounded or rather 
the foundation upon which it reposes is 
either a mistaken notion or a lie." 



CHAPTER VII 

'^'^THE CASE OF MEXICO^^ — PEESIDENT WOOD- 
ROW WILSON THE AMERICAN POINT 

OF VIEW. 

I must begin by confessing that until 
recently I had always considered the 
Hon. Woodrow Wilson, President of the 
United States, as a pure idealist. After 
watching him at closer range, speaking 
with people who have known him inti- 
mately for many years and studying his 
political career I have modified my opin- 
ion of him. 

There are in Mr. Wilson two very well 
defined personalities: The philosopher 
who in his speculations arrives at idealistic 
conclusions, and the positivistic politician, 
energetic, unyielding. It seems as 
though his political creed was that it is bet- 
ter to be difficult to dissuade than easy to 
persuade. 

He has the ability to impart to his pol- 
icy an appearance of idealism and to con- 

135 



186 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

vince his friends, as well as his enemies, 
that they are dealing with the most stub- 
born schoolmaster instead of with the 
most astute politician that the United 
States has ever bred. 

I have noticed, not without surprise, 
that this so-called idealist who is supposed 
to know nothing whatever of practical 
politics, has forced a recalcitrant congress 
to adopt two important measures to which 
important sections of the three great par- 
ties had previously declared their bitter 
antagonism. 

If you care to trace his earlier record 
as governor of New Jersey, the convic- 
tion will grow upon you that Machiavelli 
would have been clay in Wilson's hands, 
and what is more, that Machiavelli would 
never have known it! If you follow him 
still further back, and scrutinize his 
career as president of the miniature re- 
public at Princeton, you will gather the 
most enlightening evidence of all; for 
eleven years, facing conditions indescrib- 
ably unfavorable to his program, he 
so thoroughly dominated the forces align- 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 137 

ed against him that every one of his plans 
was finally carried out. And yet, when 
he left, his enemies agreed in saying of 
him, with the contemptous pity of the 
practical man for the thinker: "Yes, a 
brilliant man, a wonderful dreamer, a 
great student, but too set in his ways. 
He will not give way even in minor mat- 
ters in order to get his way in big ones. 
He's obstinate, impolitic, unpractical. 
He's not enough of a politician for a job 
like this!" 

Whether he is or is not a politician, 
whether he is practical or unpractical, the 
fact remains that Mr. Woodrow Wilson 
made his way to the Presidency of the Re- 
public. It is true that he reached that 
position by a mere accident, but he reach- 
ed it just the same. 

Let us now consider the conditions as 
Mr. Wilson found them when he assumed 
the presidency. He was chosen by a mi- 
nority of the voters, and though the op- 
position is divided, it is quite unanimous 
in wishing him ill. The government at 
Washington is an endless game of politics 



138 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

for politics' sake. If by any trick or 
manoeuvre either of the two elements bit- 
terly hostile to Wilson and to all he stands 
for, could compromise him in the eye of 
the country, his power to carry through 
the program to which he is pledged, 
would come to an abrupt end. For 
though he has a nominal party behind him, 
it must not be forgotten that his party is 
made up of heterogeneous elements so 
oddly-matched, that it is laughable to see 
them in even a temporary accord. The 
Democratic Party, even in its palmy ante- 
bellum days, was a house divided against 
itself; in those days North against South, 
at present East against West in its opin- 
ions. It ranges from Bryanism at one 
extreme, to the ultra-conservatism of 
Parker at the other. It includes the un- 
speakable Tammany element in New 
York and the blue-blooded aristocracy of 
the Southern States. Its present ma- 
jority in congress does not correspond to 
any majority of the voters, and this acci- 
dentally established majority is itself so 
heterogeneous that only a master in the 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 139 

game of politics could possibly hope to 
unite it in support of a definite, sane pol- 
icy. Let us remember that from 1856 to 
1913 the Democratic Party has been very 
seldom able either to put itself in power, 
or when it has accomplished this, to main- 
tain harmony within itself long enough to 
carry out even a plank of its program. 

Behind the Democratic congress there 
stands no real popular force, save the 
negative power of divided opposition, an 
opposition which may unite at any time 
to drive Democracy out of power. 

The voter of this country gleans his 
political preferences almost entirely from 
the newspapers, the majority of which are 
opposed to Wilson. Wilson is like a 
general, commanding a small force of ex- 
ceedingly unreliable troops, officered by 
ambitious and jealous subordinates, and 
wholly surrounded and outnumbered by 
foes, momentarily at odds with one an- 
other. Should the opposition press solid- 
ly united against him he would fail as 
pitifully as Cleveland did. 

Such a man in such a situation had 



140 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

to cope on the very first day of his 
administration with a foreign compli- 
cation which has not the remotest bear- 
ing upon the program which he pledged 
himself to carry out. He had to solve a 
question upon which it is impossible to se- 
cure trustworthy information. His 
agents disagree radically in their reports. 
He considers the most important of them 
Mr. Henry L. Wilson, for whom I have 
the greatest esteem, as avowedly hostile to 
him personally and politically. What- 
ever his final decision may be he knows in 
advance that the opposition will condemn 
it. If he is not very careful he may in- 
volve the country in a war which would 
spell disaster in more ways than one. 

Mr. Wilson's policy in regard to 
Mexico is well summarized in the follow- 
ing letter written to me by a clever Ameri- 
can journalist: 

"Wilson knows that in the country, 
among the classes from which he draws 
support and to which he must look for its 
continuance, there is a strong hostility to 
bloody tactics, and a consequent dislike of 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 141 

those on whom a blood suspicion rests. 
He knows, as any newspaper reader must 
know, that any appearance of friendship 
with Huerta would compromise him in the 
eye of the real governing class of the 
country. He knows, too, that every op- 
position newspaper in the land is ready to 
attack him the instant he takes this course, 
and that the attack will find a ready sym- 
pathy among the stable element of the 
population. Indeed, many of the hostile 
papers, surveying the situation, have al- 
ready reached the conclusion that the ad- 
ministration will be compelled to recog- 
nize the de facto government as also the 
government de jure, and on this supposi- 
tion, have already begun to condemn any 
such recognition, and in some cases, even 
to demand excitedly that the United 
States intervene at once to reestablish the 
remnants of the fallen government. This 
chorus swells and rises while Wilson waits 
and ponders and inquires, a well known 
habit of his. He rarely acts until he 
knows all there is to know about what he 
is doing. The wolves and jackals of the 



142 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

press are pressing him close, ready to 
spring upon him the moment he takes 
what they never neglect to call the bloody 
hand of Huerta. 

"Wilson plays his favorite game. He 
takes a lofty stand. He refuses to coun- 
tenance Huerta by any formal recog- 
nition. Here you have your Puritan. I 
believe he followed, as he always has fol- 
lowed, the dictates of his conscience, but I 
am very sure that in so deciding he knew 
that he was outwitting his foes as cleverly 
as he always does. He left the opposition 
press gasping. It has to commend his 
decision, it had to cease howling him down, 
and to praise him instead. And the great 
majority of sober citizens up here had 
nothing but praise for his course. It left 
him firmly in control of his destinies, with 
a tight grip on his congress and with the 
country confident that he might be trusted 
to keep us out of warfare, at the worst, 
and at the best, might bring us through 
the crisis with honor and profit. 

"That you and I happen to know how 
erroneous the information was as regards 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 143 

Huerta, that we happen to have a clear 
understanding of the actual conditions of 
Mexico, is merely our good fortune. You 
have no idea of the mass of outrageously- 
false information on the subject which has 
filtered through our press into our public 
during the past nine months. The aver- 
age citizen here knows nothing more about 
Huerta than that it is difficult to pro- 
nounce his name and that he is strongly 
suspected of having committed a rather 
contemptible murder. Carranza, Villa, 
Zapata and the rest are only names to us. 
We look at the headlines each morning 
with a languid curiosity, and if no officer, 
smoking a cigarette gaily while the firing 
party took aim, has been executed, we 
turn to the more diverting debate on our 
tariff or our currency. 

"Now, in estimating President Wilson's 
acumen, please consider it from the Am- 
erican point of view, for it is from that 
point of view that he had necessarily to 
adopt his course. Whatever may be best 
for Mexico, however clearly he may recog- 
nize it, it is none the less his paramount 



144 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

duty to do what is best for the United 
States. And if we had to reach a con- 
clusion as to what is best for the United 
States, you and I, following his reasoning, 
would both arrive at precisely his conclu- 
sion. 

"For, first of all, he must at all costs 
avoid any entanglement. You will admit 
that in recognizing neither of the parties 
he played safe in that respect. You will 
also admit that there was an undeniable 
risk of entanglement in recognizing 
Huerta; for once having done so, we 
should be under some obligation in the 
matter of compelling the rebels, if success- 
ful, as they might easily have been, accord- 
ing to the best judgment we could form, 
to live up to the obligations assumed by 
Huerta in regard to the other nations and 
their citizens. Moreover, had we recog- 
nized Huerta, we would necessarily have 
placed ourselves in a position hostile to 
the irresponsible but all-powerful rebel 
forces, and thus exposed our own citizens 
and their properties, to reprisals which 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 145 

would have called loudly for interven- 
tion." 

I have thought it necessary to draw a 
picture of President Wilson as I visualize 
him today, and to produce all the available 
facts in order to explain, not to justify, 
his attitude toward the "Case of Mexico" 
in order to impart to this study of the situ- 
ation absolute impartiality, and to dis- 
prove in advance any charge of bias that 
might be made against me. My jealous 
patriotism could no more excuse or jus- 
tify such a mistake on my part than Mr. 
Wilson's jealous patriotism, whether we 
consider Mr. Wilson as a mere man, or as 
President, could excuse his policy toward 
Mexico. 

To explain the motives of some one's 
conduct is not to justify them. 



CHAPTER VIII 

the policy of president huerta the 

"coup d^etat/^ 

The state of affairs obtaining in Mexico 
on February 18, 1913, was similar to that 
which obtained in France on February 24, 
1848. A historian of that epoch describes 
it as follows: "It was a body without a 
soul, a ship without a rudder, a fleet with- 
out an admiral, a house without a master, 
a nation without a ruler, a virgin land 
without an owner. In whom should the 
Power, the Authority be vested? In the 
first occupant. The ground belongs to 
the first occupant. If the occupation of 
the ground is the origin of property, the 
assumption of the power is the necessary 
condition for its existence." 

With Madero's advent the old order 
passed, but no new order was ushered in; 
at l^st we failed to see that new order, no 
faintest outline of it appeared on the hori- 
zon. Maderism inherited all the debts of 

146 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 147 

Porfirism. Facing terrible difficulties, 
many of which it had created itself, it fail- 
ed, or did not try, to surmount any of 
them. Its task was extremly arduous 
and it certainly showed itself unequal to 
it. It neither reformed nor reconstructed. 
It gave to the people neither the order nor 
the freedom promised them, nor the pros- 
perity it had led them to expect ; it did not 
even lay the corner stone of the democ- 
racy it had heralded so loudly. 

The Mexican people were not really 
revolutionary. Madero made them so, 
and they have remained so. 

The revolution which resulted from the 
San Luis manifesto, like all the revolu- 
tions which degenerate into hysteria, led 
unavoidably to the coming of a Caesar, a 
Cromwell, or a Napoleon. Why not of 
a Washington? Simply because revolu- 
tions that degenerate into hysteria do not 
produce that type of men. Even a Wash- 
ington would prove a failure in such cases ; 
a Washington could unite into one nation 
homogeneous racial elements; he could 
not control the heterogeneous elements of 



148 / THE CASE OF MEXICO 

a disorganized society and weld them into 
a nation. 

After the fall of Madero, Mexico was 
no man's land ; it was at the mercy of the 
first who would dare to take it. No civil- 
ian, however, was able to accomplish that 
feat. That was a soldier's job. Then 
appeared General Huerta, who saw his 
opportunity, when so many were hesitat- 
ing, so many afraid, and so many indif- 
ferent. He felt it was his patriotic duty 
to take the situation in hand. 

We must remember that at that precise 
moment there were only two men fit to as- 
sume the supreme power: Felix Diaz and 
Victoriano Huerta. Both wanted it, 
Felix Diaz for a later date when the elec- 
tions would take place, Huerta wanted it 
at once, ready as he was to assume all the 
responsibilities and to cope with all the 
difficulties. Felix Diaz was the theorist, 
Huerta the practical man. Felix Diaz 
was advised by idealists and amateur poli- 
ticians ; Huerta followed only his own ad- 
vice. Felix Diaz knew what he wanted; 
Huerta wanted what he wanted. Felix 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 149 

Diaz was hesitating; Victoriano Huerta 
never vacillated. Felix Diaz proved to be 
a real man; Victoriano Huerta a sterling 
character. 

The rebels of the citadel thought that 
Huerta was the last card they should play 
in order to win the game, and they played 
it ; they thought that the victorious general 
would be a tool in their hands ; he became, 
instead, the supreme arbiter with well- 
defined plans in his head. He had not 
longed for the supreme authority, but 
when it became his, he had the will-power 
to exert it. 

Once established in the presidency, he 
set out to remove, without haste, but 
quickly and cleverly, whatever constituted 
an obstacle to the realization of his 
political and patriotic projects. The 
pact of the citadel, owing to which he had 
become leader of the revolution and ar- 
rived at the presidency through the regu- 
lar constitutional procedure, was a bind- 
ing agreement. He did not break it, but 
he saw to it that both parties agreed to let 
it remain a dead letter. 



150 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

The cabinet appointed in compliance 
with that pact was preposterous. The 
president realized that with such col- 
laborators, every one of whom repre- 
sented a different political tendency and 
had a different origin, it would be im- 
possible for him to follow any logical 
policy. After cancelling the pact he 
eliminated one minister after another, re- 
taining only one whom he thought could 
work harmoniously with him. Even this 
one, however, was eliminated as soon as 
Huerta came to consider him as useless 
and dangerous. 

General Felix Diaz was to him a dis- 
turbing element, not as man nor as offi- 
cer, but as leader of a political party, in 
fact of the only party of real importance. 
He prevailed upon Felix Diaz to join 
again the army with which he was no 
longer officially connected. He restored 
him to his rank and conferred upon him 
the badge of a military order, thus re- 
taining him as a subaltern of the presi- 
dent of the Republic. He entrusted him 
later with a most flattering mission 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 151 

abroad, which made it difficult for him to 
return in time for the general elections, 
although he had full authorization to re- 
turn whenever he deemed fit. After 
Felix Diaz's departure the Felixist 
party found itself practically decapi- 
tated. Felix Diaz was nothing politically 
without his party; the Felixist party de- 
rived all its importance in election time 
from the presence of its leader. Felix 
Diaz gone, the Felixist party and its can- 
didate were eliminated from the contest 
and President Huerta was able thereafter 
to attend undisturbed to his work of re- 
construction. 

The houses of Parliament proved to 
be an obstacle to the pacification of the 
country; General Huerta made them 
realize that he was perfectly able to do 
without them whatever he had set out to 
do with them. He tried his best to im- 
press his will upon the Chamber of Depu- 
ties, which was the more turbulent of the 
two, but when he saw that nothing could 
be accomplished through suasion and that 
the Chamber was becoming a nest of con- 



152 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

spirators, when he was convinced that the 
only alternative was to eliminate Parlia- 
ment or be eliminated by it, he resolved 
upon a coup d'etat. 

The American government was greatly 
exercised over the happenings of the 
Bloody Ten Days, over the stories circu- 
lated by the Maderists, and the protest of 
the Madero family, and it assumed from 
the first a markedly hostile attitude to- 
wards President Huerta, indeed refusing 
to recognize him. It was not possible to 
eliminate the American government as 
President Huerta had eliminated the 
other obstacles; to the impulsive Ameri- 
can diplomacy. President Huerta op- 
posed the Mexican diplomacy of passive 
resistance, thus preserving a status quo 
which has lasted over nine months; dur- 
ing that time the Americans have ex- 
hausted every form of threat ; while the 
Mexicans, following the maxim which 
says : "Do not worry and nothing will 
happen," have opposed to them the force 
of inertia. 

Viewed from the proper angle, the ac- 






<^w ^^ 



£» 



) 





GENERAL PASCUAL OROZCO 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 153 

tions of the rebel bands did not trouble 
him; on the contrary, they rather served 
his purpose; the rebels were such a 
burden to the country that the popula- 
tion, alarmed, harrassed, humiliated and 
covered with ridicule, would finally rise 
in anger against them and become the 
most powerful weapon for their destruc- 
tion. Huerta had shown how indispens- 
able he was in warfare against the rebels, 
and this made his position more secure. 
The government at Washington would 
also be driven some time into comparing 
the methods of Huerta' s government and 
those of the rebels, and could no longer 
either help them directly as it had been 
doing, or help them indirectly as it had 
threatened to do. This would first con- 
tribute to a pacification of the country 
and eventually oblige the American gov- 
ernment to recognize the Mexican gov- 
ernment, already recognized by almost 
every nation in the world. General 
Huerta considered that the rebellion, 
with its orgy of brutality, carried in itself 



154 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

its own condemnation and its death sen- 
tence. 

Such was, in its main lines, the policy 
of President Huerta: A rigidly straight 
line when it came to laying plans, a series 
of bold curves when it came to the ways 
and means; it had, in brief, the essentials 

of any clever policy. 

* * * 

Among the charges brought against 
President Huerta, especially in the 
United States, we may mention that of 
executing a coup d'etat, a thing unknown 
in the United States. 

Francis Bulnes, a well known Mexican 
publicist, who is not connected in any 
way with the present government, pub- 
lished, a few days after the dissolution 
of the Chambers, an article in which is to 
be found, if not an approval of that ex- 
ceptional act, at least an explanation and 
a general justification of it. 

"A coup d'etat," Bulnes wrote, "is a 
hygienic measure against the demagogic 
rabble when it seizes the powers of gov- 
ernment and keeps the population terri- 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 155 

fied by its excesses, or its propensity to 
commit excesses. A coup d'etat is also a 
weapon against dreamers and deluded re- 
formists, who, as soon as they gather 
political strength, set out to govern an 
absolutely imaginary population or be- 
come fanatics and show themselves more 
arbitrary, more cruel, more predatory 
than the demagogues themselves. What- 
ever the case may be, the lowest classes 
find themselves in a state of trepidation, 
for the government, weakened by its in- 
ability to govern with a majority of the 
nation, is no longer in a position to pro- 
tect them; they are filled with a deep 
hatred for the tyranny of the aristocrats, 
of the demagogues, and of the impulsive, 
unbalanced prophets. A coup d'etat 
executed by a liberator, be he sincere or 
hypocritical, is always beneficial to the 
lower classes which always welcome it 
with pleasure and gratitude, and give 
their assistance to their liberator, be he 
real or false, reserving themselves the 
right to hate him when his imposture is 
exposed." 



156 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

This has been fully confirmed by 
history from the famous coup d'etat, the 
first in date, executed by Cromwell, to 
the one which we are now discussing, not 
to forget the many which took place in 
France. 

After the 23rd of April I came to the 
conclusion that a coup d'etat would be 
inevitable, and in the various articles 
which I published in La Trihuna of 
Mexico City, and in La Eevista de Yuca- 
tan of Merida, I did my best to show to 
the Chamber of Deputies that they were 
provoking that step, making it in fact 
necessary. Let us cast a retrospective 
glance upon what took place in the two 
years previous. 

On May 26, 1911, General Porfirio 
Diaz and Ramon Corral tendered their 
resignation as president and vice-presi- 
dent of the Republic. The Chamber of 
Deputies accepted it, and the 1st of June, 
that is a week later, issued a call for ex- 
traordinary elections in order to fill the 
vacant posts. At the end of the Diaz 
regime all the governors of States aban- 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 15T 

doned their positions, some tendering 
their resignations, some asking for in- 
definite leave, and being replaced by par- 
tisans of Madero. 

On February 19, 1913, President 
Francisco I, Madero and Vice-President 
Pino Suarez tendered jointly their re- 
signation, which was accepted at once by 
the Chamber of Deputies. The gov- 
ernors of States, however, did not follow 
their example, nor did the Chamber is- 
sue at once a call for extraordinary elec- 
tions, as it had done after the fall of 
President Diaz. The explanation of this 
is that General Diaz's resignation was 
final and in good faith, while Madero' s 
was merely a makeshift, a subterfuge to 
save his life and escape jail; but he al- 
ways hoped to return to the fight, waving 
the banner of legality. Madero was not 
the only person to nourish such hopes; 
all his followers held the same view, and 
even after Madero and Pino Suarez had 
disappeared, they clung to the idea of a 
restoration that would bring back into 
power, if not the leaders themselves, for 



158 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

that was impossible, at least the system. 
Madero was dead but Maderism had sur- 
vived him. 

The Maderists thought that their over- 
throw was only temporary, an accidental 
loss easily recouped. They resorted to 
conspiracy; they soon raised the standard 
of revolt, and the Porra group, which 
predominated even in the Chamber of 
Deputies, assumed the leadership of all 
the intrigues and the rebellion. 

President Huerta acted in obedience 
to the constitutional provision, according 
to which a call must be issued for extra- 
ordinary elections as soon as the presi- 
dency and the vice-presidency are vacant ; 
in March he gave to the permanent com- 
mission of the Chamber of Deputies an 
order to issue the call so that the elections 
could take place on July 27; he con- 
sidered that in four months there would 
be plenty of time to organize the various 
parties, select candidates, conduct cam- 
paigns and attend to the various pre- 
liminaries of an election. That order 
created a scandal among the Maderist 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 159 

deputies. The minister of State, Alberto 
Garcia Granados, was bitterly attacked 
for the "haste" with which he had trans- 
mitted the order to the permanent com- 
mission, only a few days before the 
opening of the Chamber. 

The regular session of the Legislature 
opened April 1st and the Chamber of 
Deputies discussed the order of the execu- 
tive. On the 23rd of that month I pub- 
lished in La Tribuna an article entitled, 
"A Grave Problem Must Be Solved," in 
which I said among other things: 

"A deep divergence of opinions exists 
among the deputies to the Federal Con- 
gress; some consider this disagreement as 
scandalous, some rejoice over it, but the 
greater part of the nation feels very 
nervous over it. This divergence of 
opinion is due to shady motives, to 
political intrigues absolutely foreign to 
sane politics, to personal ambitions, to 
the desire of a certain group to prolong 
the uncertainty in order to foster anar- 
chistic designs. The question is not as 
to whether it was convenient or not to 



160 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

issue a call for the elections, but whether 
or not the constitutional provisions should 
be respected. Viewing the problem from 
this angle, and it should not be viewed 
from any other, there is only one alterna- 
tive: either adhere to the constitutional 
principle, regardless of consequences, or 
violate the constitution; in the latter case 
the Chamber of Deputies would execute 
a coup d'etat, that is, usurp the power 
arbitrarily, resort to extraordinary and 
violent measures and amend the charter 
without observing the procedure de- 
manded by the law. 

"The Chamber is confronted by the fol- 
lowing dilenmia: Either the constitution 
pure and simple, or a military dictator- 
ship." 

Yielding at last to the insistence of the 
executive, of which the reader must make 
a mental note, the Chamber resolved to 
issue the call, selecting October 23rd as 
the date of the elections and hoping that 
in the interval some incident would make 
this decree void. If the elections had 
taken place in July, as President Huerta 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 161 

wished it, a coup d'etat would not have 
been necessary on the part of the execu- 
tive. 

In a memorandum sent on November 8 
to the diplomatic corps, Mr. Moheno, 
minister of foreign affairs, outlining the 
policy of President Huerta, expressed 
himself as follows on this particular 
point : 

"In order to carry out the second part 
of his programme (holding the elections) 
the Executive bowed respectfully before 
the sovereignty of the other powers; un- 
fortunately one of the Chambers vested 
with the legislative power, the Chamber 
of Deputies, pretended to encroach upon 
the privileges of the Executive power and 
refused in certain cases to recognize the 
judicial power; the attitude of several 
deputies, who, protected by their par- 
liamentary immunity, were intriguing 
openly and even taking part in armed re- 
volts, made it impossible for Parliament 
to work in harmony with the Executive 
power. As no government can accomp- 
lish anything without that harmony, the 



162 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

President of the Republic saw himself 
compelled to dissolve the Chamber of 
Deputies ; this step was necessary to save 
the Republic and to forestall the anarchy 
which would have undoubtedly set in if 
open rebellion had been tolerated within 
one of the constituted powers. As the 
Senate could not constitutionally legis- 
late alone, the Congress was declared dis- 
solved. It never was the desire of the 
Executive, however, to govern extra-con- 
stitutionally ; he therefore issued at once 
a call for congressional elections, and he 
simply assumed, in the interval, extra- 
ordinary privileges in the departments of 
finance, state and war, whenever this ap- 
peared indispensable. He did this with 
the solemn understanding that he would 
render full account of his use of such 
privileges to the new Congress as soon as 
it would be in session. The provisional 
government took also very good care to 
respect and to sustain the judicial power 
which continued to discharge very actively 
its august mission to protect individual 
guaranties; these guaranties were never 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 163 

abolished by the administration except on 
such occasions when this was made neces- 
sary by the condition of civil war which 
still prevails in several parts of the Re- 
public." 

The reader may remark: "This is a 
dictatorship!" Well, it is. 

In an article I published on May 13, 
1913, that is five months before the coup 
d'etat, I made the following statements: 

"Let us leave aside all fancy concep- 
tions, all romanticism; let us not get 
drunk on sonorous sentences; let us not 
deceive the people with tinsel and idle 
speeches; let us face the situation 
courageously, call a spade a spade, tell 
the truth, nothing but the truth. 

"In politics situations are more im- 
portant than theories. 

"I shall be absolutely frank. I am 
speaking in my own name, not in behalf 
of any party, nor even of a small coterie, 
and I assume the entire responsibility of 
my statements. I am opposed to a dic- 
tatorship, but I am more strongly op- 
posed to anarchy; if it is anarchy we are 



164 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

facing (and it may be that we are act- 
ually on the verge of it) , I prefer a Mexi- 
can dictator to a foreign invader and con- 
queror; for it is a foreign invasion which 
is being precipitated by the machinations 
of the revolutionists, bandits, conspira- 
tors, and the miserable intrigues of many 
men whose sacred duty it would be to save 
their own country. 

"If some day a dictatorship succeeds 
in saving the country, I, for one, in spite 
of my liberalism and of my democratic 
instincts, will be the first to acclaim it; 
for to me the interest of the country is 
the first and most important considera- 
tion." 

In the address which he read at the 
opening of the new Legislature, Presi- 
dent Huerta said with his usual frank- 
ness: 

"Judging the situation calmly, I can- 
not see that the constitutional order of 
things was interfered with through the 
dissolution of the Chamber, except when 
the executive power began to invade the 
sphere of action of the other powers. Be 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 166 

it as it may, however, it will always be a 
high and noble duty, or at least a com- 
mendable attitude to save a nation at the 
cost of all principles; what is the good of 
preserving, at the cost of the nation's life, 
rigid and inert theories whose fairness 
and usefulness will always remain sub- 
ject to discussion; the ultimate truth is to 
be foimd in that saying of Bonaparte's: 
*In saving the country one does not vio- 
late any law.' " 



CHAPTER IX 

"the MEXICAN problem"" PRESIDENT 

WILSON^S ATTITUDE CONSIDERED FROM 
THE POINT OF VIEW OF REASON AND 
JUSTICE. 

If the president of the United States 
had merely refused to recognize the pro- 
visional government of Mexico, I would 
say that he had made use of an impre- 
scriptible right. Almost every nation in 
the world recognized that government 
officially, some immediately, some a 
while later, in spite of the implacable 
hostility President Wilson has mani- 
fested towards President Huerta, a hos- 
tility which seems to be the consequence 
of a personal dislike rather than that of 
a political attitude. 

So it is apparently; in reality it is a 
part of a programme cleverly thought out 
by a man of great ability and of noted 
tenacity. "The Mexican problem" is a 
convenient excuse for carrying out that 
programme; and President Wilson, with 

166 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 107 

the most perfect scorn for idealism, never 
misses any opportunity to carry it out. 

Instead of keeping his hands off the 
national affairs of Mexico he interferes 
with them in order to fit them to his pur- 
pose. He first sent to President Huerta 
emissaries who asked for his resignation, 
a request which Huerta roundly denied, 
to his honor and to the honor of Mexico. 
Had Huerta complied with the orders 
sent from Washington he would have 
been both a coward and a traitor. A 
coward if he had yielded to the threats of 
a declared enemy; a traitor if he had 
accepted the protectorate of a foreign 
nation, the dictatorship of a foreign gov- 
ernment. The very minute that crime 
would have been committed Mexico 
would have lost its political autonomy. 
Mexico would have been compelled hence- 
forth to apply at the White House for 
its powerful host's advice as to who might 
be persona grata as president. And any 
time that president would have failed to 
give satisfaction to the United States an 



168 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

emissary would have been sent to ask for 
his resignation. 

After this, not only would the United 
States have exerted a direct suzerainty 
over Mexico, which is the object of its 
ambition, but Mexico would have virt- 
ually become an American colony. 

Some pretend that Mr. Wilson's atti- 
tude was prompted by a desire to help in 
a neighborly way the settlement of our 
domestic troubles, for a reconciliation of 
all the parties could have been brought 
about more easily, they say, had Huerta 
resigned. This is a pure supposition. 
The truth is that when Mr. Wilson de- 
cided upon that step the rebellion had 
barely begun and had not assumed any 
importance. When he threatened Presi- 
dent Huerta, however, the rebels thought 
they had found an ally in the American 
government, they breathed more freely, 
nourished greater hopes, and the rebellion 
began to spread. 

The pretext which Mr. Wilson gave 
for not recognizing Huerta was that he 
could not sympathize with a man who had 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 169 

assumed the power to further his interests 
and his personal ambition. This is what 
he said a few days after his election to 
the presidency; in an address he delivered 
at Dwarthmore, Pennsylvania, he was 
more explicit: "No government can ex- 
ist," he said, "which is stained with blood 
or which is not governing with the con- 
sent of the governed." 

In August, 1913, Mr. Wilson decided 
to take action in regard to the Mexican 
problem and entrusted John Lind, ex- 
governor of Minnesota, with a confi- 
dential mission to Huerta. While Mr. 
Lind's mission was of a diplomatic char- 
acter, nothing could have in reality less 
conformed to diplomatic usage, for Mr. 
Lind carried no credentials accrediting 
him as official representative of the 
Washington government in Mexico, or 
as President Wilson's confidential agent. 

The instructions he received from his 
government had, at least as far as they 
are known, the character of an ulti- 
matum. 

Mr. Lind's instructions were to "press 



170 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

very earnestly upon those who are now 
exercising authority or wielding influ- 
ence," that "the government of the 
United States does not feel at liberty any 
longer to stand inactively by while no 
real progress is being made toward the 
establishment of a government in the 
City of Mexico which the country will 
obey and respect." The president con- 
tinued : 

"A satisfactory settlement seems to us 
to be conditioned on: 

"(a) An immediate cessation of fight- 
ing throughout Mexico; a definite ar- 
mistice solemnly entered into and scrupu- 
lously observed. 

"(b) Security given for an early and 
free election in which all agree to take 
part. 

"(c) The consent of General Huerta 
to bind himself not to be a candidate for 
election as president of the Republic at 
this election, and 

"(d) The agreement of all parties to 
abide by the results of the election and co- 
operate in the most loyal way in organ- 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 171 

izing and supporting the new administra- 
tion." 

He added: 

"If Mexico can suggest any better way 
in which to show our friendship, serve the 
people of Mexico and meet our interna- 
tional obligations, we are more than 
willing to consider the suggestion." 

It seems almost incredible that such 
suggestions could have been made in ab- 
solute earnest. And yet, in spite of their 
unusual and humiliating character, the 
Mexican government considered them 
carefully. In a perfectly courteous note, 
containing now and then, however, some 
veiled sarcasm, Mr. Huerta answered 
that he could not promise to stop the 
hostilities nor enter into a definite ar- 
mistice with unorganized groups of 
bandits; the freedom of elections would 
of course be protected, but the govern- 
ment could not guarantee that all the par- 
ties would abide by their results and co- 
operate in organizing and supporting the 
new administration. The demand that 
General Huerta should not run as candi- 



172 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

date in the presidential elections could 
not be considered, for besides being un- 
usual and unjustifiable, such a demand 
could appear inspired by personal ani- 
mus; the Mexican citizens alone could 
decide that question at the polls. 

How did President Wilson imagine 
that President Huerta could effect a 
compromise in behalf of the rebels and 
bandits in league against his administra- 
tion? And even if Huerta had had the 
boldness to make such an agreement, 
what confidence could it have inspired to 
the United States? 

Finally President Wilson did not 
know, when he made his third suggestion, 
that this point was already settled by the 
Mexican constitution, which absolutely 
forbids the immediate election of the pro- 
visional president. 

Mr. Wilson is intelligent and cultured 
enough to understand that his suggestions 
could not have any favorable effect, as 
their wording was offensive. To consider 
General Huerta, not as president of the 
Republic but as governor of Mexico, was 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 173 

to offer him an insult. To suggest an 
arrangement presupposing impossible 
conditions was merely farcical. The 
shrewd and illustrious Mr. Wilson never 
intended to settle the Mexican difficulties. 
He had a different object in view. What 
was it? 

In the message he read to the Ameri- 
can Congress on December 2nd, 1913, he 
had the following to say to the Mexican 
question : 

"There is but one cloud upon our hori- 
zon. That has shown itself to the south 
of us, and hangs over Mexico. There 
can be no certain prospect of peace in 
America until General Huerta has sur- 
rendered his usurped authority in Mexi- 
co ; until it is understood on all hands, in- 
deed, that such pretended governments 
will not be countenanced or dealt with by 
the government of the United States. 
We are the friends of constitutional gov- 
ernment in America ; we are more than its 
friends, we are its champions; because in 
no other way can our neighbors, to whom 
we would wish in every way to make 



174 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

proof of our friendship, work out their 
own development in peace and liberty. 
Mexico has no government. The attempt 
to maintain one at the City of Mexico has 
broken down, and a mere military despot- 
ism has been set up which has hardly more 
than the semblance of national authority. 
It originated in the usurpation of Vic- 
toriano Huerta, who, after a brief at- 
tempt to play the part of constitutional 
president, has at last cast aside even the 
pretense of legal right and declared him- 
self dictator. As a consequence, a condi- 
tion of affairs now exists in Mexico which 
has made it doubtful whether even the 
most elementary and fundamental rights 
either of her own people or of the citi- 
zens of other countries resident within her 
territory can long be successfully safe- 
guarded, and which threatens, if long con- 
tinued, to imperil the interests of peace, 
order, and tolerable life in the lands im- 
mediately to the south of us. Even if the 
usurper had succeeded in his purposes, in 
despite of the constitution of the Repub- 
lic and the rights of its people, he would 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 1T5 

have set up nothing but a precarious and 
hateful power, which could have lasted 
but a little while, and whose eventual 
downfall would have left the country in 
a more deplorable condition than ever. 
But he has not succeeded. He has for- 
feited the respect and the moral support 
even of those who were at one time will- 
ing to see him succeed. Little by little he 
has been completely isolated. By a little 
every day his power and prestige are 
crumbling and the collapse is not far 
away. We shall not, I believe, be obliged 
to alter our policy of watchful waiting. 
And then, when the end comes, we shall 
hope to see constitutional order restored 
in distressed Mexico by the concert and 
energy of such of her leaders as prefer the 
liberty of their people to their own am- 
bitions." 

I may now ask if the situation the 
Mexican government is facing is such as 
Mr. Wilson pictures it, who is mainly re- 
sponsible for it? Who but the man who, 
witnessing the failure of his "policy of 
persuasion," antagonized the government 



176 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

(not of Mexico City but of the immense 
majority of the Mexican Republic), al- 
lowed the rebels to supply themselves 
with arms and ammunition, and to raise 
money and even recruits in American 
territory, the man who established a 
"pacific blockade" of all our ports, ad- 
vised the European markets to refuse 
further loans to the provisional govern- 
ment, tried to prevail upon the foreign 
powers to break up their relations with 
that government and did his best to dis- 
credit, to starve, and to ruin Mexico. 

Hasn't the Honorable Mr. Wilson 
given thereby effective assistance to the 
rebels? Hasn't he thus conducted against 
the provisional government a campaign 
more ruthless, more active, and more effi- 
cient than the campaigns conducted by 
Zapata, Villa, Carranza, and other rebel 
leaders ? 

That he favors the rebels is obvious. 
Last December Rear Admiral Cowles of 
the American navy received prominent 
Sinaloa rebels on board the Pittsburg 
and entertained them as though they were 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 177 

representatives of a friendly and duly 
recognized government. An effort was 
made by the secretary of the navy to ex- 
plain this partiality to the rebels, which 
constituted an insult to the provisional 
government, by saying that the honors 
accorded to the revolutionary chiefs were 
justified by the fact that those men were 
the lawfully elected authorities in the 
State of Sinaloa. This explanation was 
published broadcast in American news- 
papers. 

The New York Times mentioning the 
incident printed a statement made by a 
prominent Mexican statesman, member 
of a faction which is not supporting 
Huerta, but which is not favorable to the 
rebels either. It reads: 

"This is not the first time that Wash- 
ington has gone out of its way to insult 
Huerta gratuitously. It seems evident 
that the Washington officials want to 
provoke Huerta to the point that he will 
commit some overt act, thus giving 
Washington a way out of the present 
muddle. 



178 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

"Huerta has thus far abstained, and is 
keeping his temper remarkably in the face 
of repeated affronts of the United States. 
It is improbable that he will commit any 
overt act on this occasion. All thinking 
Mexicans must realize that the President 
is acting for the best good of the country 
in this way." 

New York Times, Dec. 28, 1913. 

Is this really Mr. Wilson's aim? Is he 
simply waiting until Huerta gives him a 
plausible pretext for a more direct in- 
tervention in Mexico? If so, what would 
Mr. Wilson and the United States gain 
by it? God preserve the United States 
and Mexico from a war. It would be a 
scandal for humanity, a disaster for every- 
body concerned ; for Mexico it would spell 
ruin, for the United States disgrace. 
Mr. Wilson can not drag his country into 
such an abyss. 

Does he wish to help the triumph of 
the revolution? May Mr. Wilson remem- 
ber his own statements and think of what 
that triumph would entail. 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 179 

Let US make for the sake of argument 
the absurd supposition that President 
Huerta, yielding to President Wilson's 
demands, might tender his resignation. 
Let us first settle two important points: 

1. President Wilson stated to the en- 
tire world that he would never recognize 
any act of President Huerta's. Would 
he recognize his resignation? 

2. President Wilson also stated that he 
would consider as illegal the results of the 
elections to be held on October 26, 1913, 
not only as far as the president and vice- 
president, but also the senators and depu- 
ties then elected were concerned. 

To whom, then, could President 
Huerta tender his resignation? Not to 
the Mexican Congress as constituted at 
the time of Madero's fall, since it was dis- 
solved; nor to the present Legislature, 
since it has not been recognized by Mr. 
Wilson. Mr. Huerta could solve the 
difficulty by tendering his resignation to 
the Supreme Court of the nation, which 
constitutes the third power. This would 
be perfectly legal. Whom could the 



180 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

Supreme Court, however, appoint as pro- 
visional president? Neither the secretary 
of foreign affairs, nor the secretary of 
state, nor any other member of the cabinet 
designated by the constitution, since these 
men were all appointed by President 
Huerta and are therefore disqualified. 
Should the Supreme Court appoint a 
private citizen, this appointment would 
be illegal. The president thus appointed 
would find himself in a position even more 
illegal than that of the present president, 
who, much as Mr. Wilson may deny it, 
was selected in accordance with all the 
constitutional provisions. In any case, 
wouldn't the private citizen selected il- 
legally by the Supreme Court be more or 
less directly a creature of the revolution? 
We are told that another way of solv- 
ing the problem would be to give assist- 
ance to the rebels. Since we have been 
making many suppositions, let us sup- 
pose that assistance given the rebels in 
violation of all ethical principles enabled 
them to triumph. Would the great jur- 
ist, Mr. Wilson, recognize as legitimate 



iMM 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 181 

the government raised to power by their 
triumph? According to his theories, to 
his explicit and final statements, he could 
not. 

There is still another solution, one 
which in certain quarters is regarded as 
the most likely to bring definite results: 
armed intervention by the United States. 
What would be the consequences of an 
intervention? I have already answered 
that question: to eliminate the govern- 
ment of President Huerta, to put down 
the rebellion, and also I suppose to de- 
stroy the robber bands, to pacify the 
country by suasion and force, and finally 
to prepare the general elections which 
would be held freely and legally under 
the protection of the American military 
forces. 

How many years would it take to 
carry out that plan which both federals 
and rebels, in a word, the whole Mexican 
population would oppose? Would the 
government ushered in by such means be 
in any way legal? Would it be in har- 
mony with our national laws, with the 



l8^ THE CASE OF MEXICO 

rights of the people? Would it not be 
merely an emanation of the most odious 
oppression? 

An intervention would be difficult in 
theory, ineffective in practice. 

Whether our government is legal or 
illegal is a question which it behooves 
only ourselves, the Mexicans, to decide. 
If we are satisfied with it the foreign 
powers are in duty bound to recognize it. 
One may argue that at present one part 
of the population is satisfied with it, while 
another part is proclaiming its dissatis- 
faction, arms in hand. This does not 
give foreign nations any right to inter- 
fere in our affairs. On one side there 
stands a government de jure and de facto, 
on the other various rebel factions; in in- 
ternational law the former only is to be 
considered; of course, the latter could be 
recognized as belligerent, but this can 
only be done for serious reasons and ac- 
cording to certain precedents. 

I have not mentioned thus far any of 
the numerous and weighty arguments ad- 
vanced by a part of the North American 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 188 

press in condemning Mr. Wilson's policy, 
nor the opinions expressed by Latin 
Americans and European authorities 
which are also adverse to the course fol- 
lowed by the illustrious President of the 
United States in regard to the "Mexican 
problem". I did not see the necessity of 
mentioning them; the personal argu- 
ments I have presented are amply suf- 
ficient to prove that President Woodrow 
Wilson may not have overstepped the 
limits of a very special policy of his own. 
He strayed, however, beyond the limits 
of reason and justice. He is one of the 
men, perhaps the man, whom history 
will hold responsible for the situation 
with which the Mexican Republic is con- 
fronted to-day. 



CHAPTER X 

THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MEXICAN 
REVOLUTION THE ATTITUDE OF PRESI- 
DENT HUERTA AND ITS MEANING ITS 

* INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE. 

Few people, especially in the United 
States, realize the various aspects which 
the Mexican revolution has successively 
taken, and the actual meaning of Presi- 
dent Huerta's attitude. 

When Francisco I. Madero began his 
fight against President Diaz he was ac- 
tuated by democratic motives. 

The dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz had 
in the long run become unbearable, for 
the "Scientific Group," headed by Min- 
ister Limantour, opposed the introduc- 
tion of any new elements into govern- 
ment circles. 

Francisco Madero was unknown in the 
political world. He suddenly blossomed 
forth as a writer and a politician. He 
published a book, the "Presidential Prob- 

184 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 186 

lem," in which he expressed rather timid 
views. He had been born and raised in 
the atmosphere of Porfirism and he didn't 
presmne to revolt against tradition. That 
book, however, gave him a certain meas- 
ure of notoriety. 

Thereupon our new author went into 
active politics, organized clubs, and start- 
ed on a series of speaking tours, preach- 
ing the democratic gospel ; and finally ac- 
cepting the nomination for the presi- 
dency of the Republic. 

The hostility he encountered on the 
part of the government transformed the 
timid writer into a daring political lead- 
er, and the political leader into a revo- 
lutionary chief. He was arrested by 
order of the government, released on bail, 
issued a revolutionary manifesto in San 
Luis Potosi, and then fled to the United 
States. 

Madero's first activity was actuated 
by hostility to President Diaz. He 
wished to overthrow him. Later on he 
thought of assuming the presidency him- 
self. When he issued his manifesto he 



186 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

broadened his democratic ideas so much 
that they actually verged on socialism. 
To win partisans to his cause he pander- 
ed to the lowest classes and especially to 
the Indian population. In the third para- 
graph of his San Luis manifesto he said: 

"Through a vicious interpretation of 
the unimproved land law, many small 
land owners, most of them Indians, have 
been dispossessed, either by decrees of 
the secretary of public works or by judg- 
ment of the Courts of the Republic. It 
is elementary justice to return to their 
owners or to the latter's heirs the land 
of which they were despoiled through 
such immoral practices, besides indemniz- 
ing them for the losses thereby incurred." 

The lower classes placed an exagger- 
ated construction upon this promise and 
expected that all the land be divided up 
among them after the landlords had been 
expropriated. The rabble turned Ma- 
derist, and our coimitry had to face one 
of the most appalling social problems. 
Madero preached the theory; the deplor- 
able Zapata brothers put it into practice. 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 187 

Such is the origin of Zapatism as it ex- 
ists today. 

Madero triumphed. As it is one thing 
to be a pretender and another to be a 
ruler, Madero realized what consequences 
the fulfilment of his hastily made 
promises would have, and he broke his 
word. The rabble, however, would not 
be satisfied, and instead of socialism we 
had anarchy. 

There were then two revolutionary 
factions; one was opposing Madero be- 
cause he had not kept his political 
promises and established a true democ- 
racy, and had, on the contrary, disre- 
garded scandalously the expressed will of 
the people and installed a family olig- 
archy in power; another faction was hos- 
tile to every form of government and de- 
clared its intention to take possession by 
violence of all land, killing of the land- 
lords, and resorting to pillage and arson. 
This was the advent of the olocracy. 
Madero convinced himself that while a 
revolution can be accomplished with the 
help of the rabble, one cannot govern it. 



188 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

What Pancho Villa, the rebel leader, is 
now doing is the consequence of the 
promises Madero once made. 

The fall of Madero was only a na- 
tional incident, and so was the Pact of 
the Citadel. When Huerta triumphed 
he had to cope with the anarchistic condi- 
tion created by Madero, and with the in- 
trigues and agitations of the Maderists. 
The latter were rising everywhere to 
avenge Madero's death, and they failed 
or refused to realize that to avenge one 
man's death they would have to sacrifice 
thousands of innocent lives, and com- 
promise the dignitj^ of their country, if 
not jeopardise its independence. 

When General Huerta became pro- 
visional president he had few illusions 
about the situation. He realized the 
magnitude of the task which he had un- 
dertaken and the responsibilities he was 
assuming. He had, however, to pacify 
the country at any cost, without wasting 
time on metaphysical speculations. 

Unfortunately the newly-elected gov- 
ernment of the United States headed by 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 189 

President Woodrow Wilson, actuated by 
motives which no one has explained satis- 
factorily and in which some see very 
wrongly an exaggerated form of puri- 
tanism, madte plans for overthrowing 
Huerta and extending an American 
protectorate over Mexico. From that 
time on the fall of Madero assumed an 
international importance; it ceased to be 
a purely Mexican question and became 
an issue between the United States and 
the government of Mexico. 

I must repeat that any concession 
made by President Huerta under the 
pressure of President Wilson's demands 
would have been prejudicial to Mexico, 
as it would have implied the acceptance 
of a tutelage, the first phase of an actual 
protectorate which would have fatally 
resulted in the destruction of Mexico's 
national autonomy. 

President Huerta understood that very 
clearly from the very first; besides he 
saw in the attitude of the United States 
a first attempt at establishing the Am- 
erican domination over the entire North- 



190 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

ern half of the continent, whence it could 
later be extended to South America. 
The Mexican problem became henceforth 
a question affecting the entire American 
continent. 

In an address he delivered at Mobile 
in October, 1913, President Wilson en- 
deavored to appear as an idealist; who- 
ever watches him closely, however, will 
find under the idealist a politician follow- 
ing a very practical line of conduct. 

Mr. Wilson began by stating that the 
United States would never acquire an- 
other square foot of land by conquest. 

Did he imply that all other means were 
legitimate in acquiring the lands of neigh- 
boring countries, such means for instance 
as were employed in Panama or are, at 
present, in Nicaragua? 

In the course of his address Mr. Wil- 
son said that for motives of "morality" 
and a "love of constitutional liberty", 
not "for expediency", the United States 
desired to help the Latin- Amercian re- 
publics to an emancipation from "hard 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 191 

bargains" forced on them by foreign con- 
cessionaries and money lenders. 

He added: "What these states are go- 
ing to see, therefore, is an emancipation 
from the subordination which has been 
inevitable with foreign enterprise. In- 
terest has been exacted of them that was 
not exacted of anybody else, because the 
risk was said to be greater, and then se- 
curities were taken that destroyed the 
risks. An admirable arrangement for 
those who were forcing the terms. 

"I rejoice in nothing so much as in the 
prospect that they will now be emanci- 
pated from these conditions, and we 
ought to be the first to take part in as- 
sisting in that emancipation. 

"We must prove ourselves their friends 
and champions on terms of equality and 
honor." 

I will then ask with Mr. George Har- 
vey: "Now, what can this mean? That 
literally we shall forbid South American 
Governments to make further conces- 
sions to European capitalists? Or merely 



192 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

that we shall insist upon supervising the 
trades and fixing the terms?" 

Neither of those things is within the 
reach of the United States, and every 
nation on the American continent would 
revolt against such pretensions, which 
clearly reveal the United States' desire 
to exert a suzerainty over all the Latin 
Amercian countries. 

Mr. Wilson is not the originator of 
this doctrine; he is only one of its expon- 
ents and one of those who are trying to 
put it into practice. This is only one 
phase of the imperialistic policy with 
which all Latin- Americans are perfectly 
familiar, which they have analyzed close- 
ly and which they all condemn unreserv- 
edly; it is not the spoken word to which 
they pay much attention but the designs 
back of the words; they remember that 
whoever would harm us, glibly assures 
us that it is all done for our own good. 

In refusing to comply with President 
Wilson's demands. President Huerta 
not only upheld the interests of Mexico 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 193 

but made himself truly the champion of 
all the nations south of the Rio Grande. 

The Mexican problem, however, is 
much more than a continental problem; 
it is actually an international problem; it 
is bound to interest every civilized nation 
of Europe and America, since the Presi- 
dent of the United States has formally 
declared his intention to pry into every 
financial deal, and every possible conces- 
sion contract entered into by Latin Am- 
erican Republics with a citizen or a cor- 
poration of the Old World. If that plan 
were carried out, the United States 
would be absolute master of the situa- 
tion, it would gradually control every en- 
terprise, perhaps even every industry in 
our various countries. 

And yet Americans are the first ones 
to obtain onerous concessions and to in- 
vest capital in foreign countries. Mexico 
has seen them at work. Mexico has had 
a painful experience with its oil indus- 
try, in which American and English 
capitalists are in open rivalry, a rivalry 
which the rebels have cleverly taken ad- 



194 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

vantage of since the first day of the Ma- 
dero uprising, a rivalry of which the 
provisional government is still bearing 
the brunt. 

Thus it is that President Huerta, by 
opposing the encroachment of a monopo- 
listic imperialism, is upholding not only 
the interest of Mexico and of the Latin 
American nations but those of the whole 
world. 

Why has Mr. Wilson abandoned so 
completely the traditional policy of the 
United States? This policy had always 
accorded with the definition which Presi- 
dent Franklin Pierce gave of it on May 
15, 1856, in his message to Congress: 

''It is the established policy of the 
United States to recognize governments 
without question of their source of or- 
ganization or of the means by which the 
governing persons attain their power, 
provided there be a government de facto 
accepted by the people of the country. ... 
It is the more imperatively necessary to 
apply this rule to the Spanish- American 
peoples in consideration of the frequent 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 195 

and not seldom anomalous changes of or- 
ganization or administration which they 
undergo and the revolutionary character 
of most of the changes." 

Times have changed ; so have this coun- 
try's aspirations, and consequently its 
traditional policy has been cast aside. 

What is at the bottom of the personal 
and implacable hatred for Huerta which 
the Honorable Mr. Wilson reveals even 
in his official acts, as one can see from the 
various statements of his which I have 
quoted in this book? It is due to the fact 
that General Huerta proves an obstacle 
to the fulfilment of President Wilson's 
designs; Mr. Wilson is also prompted by 
an extremely human feeling: Nothing is 
more aggravating for a strong man than 
to see a man he considers as weak resist- 
ing him openly, and showing himself in- 
tractable. 

The more I study the Mexican prob- 
lem the more I am convinced that it lacks 
intrinsically the international character 
which we are attributing to it. It is 
nothing more than a conflict between the 



196 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

Wilson Doctrine, successor to the Mon- 
roe Doctrine, and the indomitable atti- 
tude of Huerta, patterned after the atti- 
tude of our immortal patriot Juarez. 

Between Wilson and Huerta the world 
will decide. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE WILSON POLICY CONDEMNED BY THE 

ENTIRE WOELD HUERTA THE MAN OF 

THE SITUATION — TIME A SOLUTION 

SHOULD BE POUND THE SOLUTION — 

MEXICO^S VITALITY. 

The Wilson policy has been con- 
demned by the entire world. The Am- 
ericans residing in Mexico, who are 
well qualified to speak of what is taking 
place there, what is to be feared or hoped 
for, have protested against it. Promi- 
nent members of the American colony 
called upon Mr. Wilson in a body for the 
purpose of conferring with him and sup- 
plying him with accurate information; 
those men told me, however, that the 
president refused to receive them, on the 
plea that he was not soliciting opinions re- 
garding Mexico. Many newspapers of 
the United States have published very il- 
luminating articles showing the mistake 
which President Wilson is making. 

All over Latin America, from Cuba to 

197 



198 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

the Straights of Magellan, the problem 
has been discussed from every angle, and 
the conclusions reached have been uni- 
formly adverse to the Wilson policy. 

The majority of the English, French, 
German and Spanish papers have con- 
demned it ; some have even gone so far as 
to prefer grave charges, which I consider 
unfounded if not slanderous, against Mr. 
Wilson, accusing him, for instance, of 
venality, an absolutely inadmissible 
charge. 

The conservative papers of all those 
countries are unanimous in stating that, 
considering the anomalous conditions 
through which our country is passing. 
General Huerta is the indispensable man 
of the hour, the only man perhaps who 
has the necessary qualifications to re- 
establish order, the only one, in any case, 
who can protect fully the lives and inter- 
ests of foreign residents. 

I admit that every man should be 
guided in the accomplishment of his task 
by idealistic motives; his feet, however, 
should remain on the ground. 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 199 

I also believe that a faith which is not 
constructive is a negation, a delusion, or 
a form of hypocrisy. 

The future does not belong to those 
who would impose their ideas through 
violent gestures, violent epithets, or viol- 
ent deeds; but to those who can reor- 
ganize society on a better basis, and unite 
men in order and harmony. 

I cannot believe that President Wil- 
son is planning to precipitate a war be- 
tween the United States and Mexico. If 
the Wilson policy has not as its sole aim 
an armed intervention and the conquest 
of Mexico, or of a section of it, Mr. Wil- 
son should direct all his energies towards 
the resumption of an harmonious modus 
vivendi with Mexico; he should abandon 
his hostile attitude and avail himself of 
the best diplomatic assistance. 

When Mr. Wilson sent Mr. Lind as 
his confidential agent, or in whatever 
capacity it may have been, a thing which 
has never been definitely ascertained, to 
present to President Huerta the inadmis- 
sible requests I have previously men- 



200 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

tioned, President Huerta was tactful 
enough to offer a counter proposition 
which, if it had been accepted, would 
have solved the difficulty. 

The perfectly dignified suggestions 
made by the Mexican statesman covered 
two points: 

1. That the Mexican Ambassador to 
Washington be received. 

2. That the United States send a new 
ambassador to Mexico without any prior 
conditions. 

Those two points encompassed a vast 
program; to enter into relations and to 
discuss the situation through diplomatic 
channels, with due regard for good form. 

Mr. Wilson must be aware of the fact 
that in international negotiations good 
form is indispensable for the arrival at a 
perfect understanding. 

Sympathies and prejudices should be 
set aside for the sake of convenience, 
reason, and justice. 

In politics there is no worse adviser 
than self-conceit. 

It is high time an end should be put to 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 201 

the present situation, which is anomalous, 
dangerous, and inexcusable, and greatly 
prejudicial to both Mexico and the 
United States. 

Mr. Wilson must not be blind to the 
facts. He must realize that, notwith- 
standing his attitude of hostility to Presi- 
dent Huerta, the latter has remained in 
power and has by this time completed his 
first year in the presidential chair. He 
must realize that, notwithstanding the 
boycott directed against the provisional 
government, it has succeeded in supply- 
ing itself with arms and ammunition, en- 
listing men and raising money ; money has 
been contributed voluntarily in Mexico 
and abroad, for the patriotic endeavors 
of President Huerta are inspiring more 
confidence than the inexplicable doings of 
the American Government. He must 
realize that notwithstanding the direct 
assistance the rebels have found in the 
United States, and the moral help the 
American Government has given them 
indirectly, they are less than ever likely 
to triumph; a few victories won in the 



202 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

frontier states where the American in- 
fluence is the most effective, mean little 
or nothing. In the rest of the country 
the government retains the upper hand, 
and Huerta has succeeded in limiting and 
localizing the insurrection. Mr. Wilson 
must realize that the triumph of the 
rebels would prove disastrous for Mexico 
and would imperil its institutions, its 
social order, and the legitimate interests 
of all foreign residents, not excluding the 
American residents. 

The Honorable Mr. Wilson has only 
one alternative ; either order an armed in- 
tervention, a course which he pretends he 
does not contemplate and which I con- 
tend he has neither the right nor the 
power to resort to; or rely entirely upon 
diplomatic action. An attitude of watch- 
ful expectancy does not constitute a so- 
lution. It constitutes a real danger; it 
is in the last analysis, inaction due to ig- 
norance of whatever action should be 
taken. 

Of all the sensible suggestions which 
have been made in connection with the 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 203 

Mexican problem, the most judicious and 
practical are to be found in a brilliant 
article published by Colonel George Har- 
vey in the North American Review, 

Mr. Harvey has reached the conclu- 
sion that the policy inaugurated and car- 
ried out by Mr. Wilson can only lead to 
a war as odious to the Americans as to 
the Mexicans "to whom we are anxious 
to show our good will". 

"The only alternative, apparently," 
Mr. Harvey writes, "is that indicated 
above, namely, a reversal of the attempt 
at dictation by means of an unworkable 
Imperialism. 

"Is not that possible? 

"Nobody here or abroad, and nobody 
in Mexico who needs be considered ques- 
tions the high purpose which has actuated 
President Wilson. Nobody suspects his 
good faith, the purity of his motives, or 
the pacificatory nature of his methods. 
NobodjT' doubts that he has done his best, 
and nobody can demonstrate that another 
could have done better. 

"But the policy which the president 



204 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

sincerely believed to be the wisest has 
failed. Why could and why should he 
not now address the de facto Government 
of Mexico substantially as follows: 

" 'We have exerted our best endeavors, 
according to our best judgment, to aid in 
restoring peace and prosperity to you, 
our neighbors, and our friends. We have 
been disinterested, as you know; but our 
suggestions, having failed to meet with 
the approval of either the provisional 
government or of the commander of the 
insurrectionary forces, have necessarily 
proved unavailing. 

" 'Deeply as we regret this circum- 
stance, we franklv admit it to be a fact. 
But it is the accomplishment, not the 
method, that we still regard as vital. 

" 'We have tried our way in vain. 
Now we stand ready to try yours. 

" 'Your Ambassador will be received 
in Washington. We will accredit a new 
Ambassador to you "without previous 
conditions." 

" 'We shall hold your government re- 
sponsible for the lives and properties of 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 205 

all foreign residents, and shall notify 
other nations to that effect. All of our 
dealings with your Administration will 
be in the open, in good faith, and in sin- 
cere hope that a truly representative and 
stable Government may soon be estab- 
lished, to the end that, within a reason- 
able time, peace and prosperity may be 
regained in all parts of your distracted 
land.' 

"We hear the objections to this new 
policy. It would be unfair to the Con- 
stitutionalists and rebels. But, since 
their leader has repulsed our attempts at 
mediation, what further claim have they 
upon our consideration? 

"It would strengthen Huerta, or 
Blanquet, or Moheno, or whoever may be 
in control when these words reach the 
public ear and mind. That cannot be 
helped. We must strengthen somebody, 
and apparently there is little room for 
choice. 

"It would be inconsistent with our de- 
clared attitude, would be a recession on 
the part of the president, would humiliate 



206 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

US as a nation in the eyes of the world. 
Perhaps, yes ; and for that very reason it 
would live forever as a performance and 
an example, as the noblest act ever done 
by a great and powerful nation in the in- 
terest of a weak and suffering people. 

"And it would avert war — at least for 
time sufficient to allow for adjustment 
and mutual understanding. That is the 
overpowering consideration which should, 
and, we hope, may influence a president 
who surely must realize that he is not 
merely the tribune of a people, but is also 
the head of a nation which should set the 
pace for all the world in works of self- 
abnegation tending to universal peace." 

If I or some other Mexican had put 
forward such arguments, they would lose 
much of their value; they would appear 
inspired by personal bias, by national 
preferences; the writer might give the 
impression that he was begging for 
mercy. Coming from an American, a 
democrat, and a sincere patriot, from one 
of the most illustrious figures in Am- 
erican journalism, they have an inestim- 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 207 

able value, and should make a deep im- 
pression on Mr. Wilson. If he disre- 
gards such advice he may some day have 
a heavy conscience. 

If any one insinuates that by making 
those arguments mine I assume the atti- 
tude of one begging for mercy, I shall 
not repudiate the charge. I am ready to 
sacrifice anything for my country's sake, 
be it my life or even my honor, which is 
dearer to me than my life. 

Mexico is now in the throes of terrible 
convulsions, but it is not dying, far from 
it. All the events that have taken place 
in my country since 1910 are only evi- 
dence of its prodigious vitality. Not- 
withstanding all the efforts we have made 
to divide ourselves into ferocious factions, 
which like tornadoes sow desolation 
wherever they pass, Mexico is living, 
striving, and has faith in itself; not only 
will it regain the prestige and prosperity 
it enjoyed until recently, but its future 
will prove greater than its past. 

This terrible period of disorder has been 



208 THE CASE OF MEXICO 

fertile in lessons by which we will profit 
in the future. 

Let us beware in politics of stagy atti- 
tudes and of well sounding platitudes. 
The former mean nothing, the latter 
prove nothing. 

We will have to rebuild upon our ruins, 
and we shall build a new edifice accord- 
ing to new plans. In the mental realm 
we are always building upon disillusion- 
ments, but we generally use our disap- 
pointment as cement. 

We must proceed according to the or- 
der of the creation; first there must be 
light, that is peace; then out of the eth- 
nical clay we hold in our hands we must 
mould a nation and breathe into it a 
national soul. Such is the task we will 
consummate, thus we will discharge our 
sacred duty as patriots and members of 
the human race. 

Will the Honorable Mr. Wilson, the 
enlightened president of the powerful 
American Republic, collaborate in this 
work of pacification, of redemption, and 
of uplift of a nation? Will he do it as an 



THE CASE OF MEXICO 209 

idealist, a puritan, a philosopher, a poli- 
tician, a practical man, or as what? May 
he do it very soon for the weal of Mexico, 
for the honor of the United States, and 
for his own glory. He has only to take 
one step backward, I mean a step for- 
ward, and confirm by deeds what he 
promised by word of mouth. 

If he can devise a way better suited to 
his nation's temperament and to his own 
personality, more effective and more dig- 
nified as far as Mexico is concerned, he 
may speak out; we shall surely find that 
solution agreeable, and General Vic- 
toriano Huerta will be the first to recon- 
cile himself to it; as a man, as a citizen, 
as a soldier, and as president, he has only 
one aim: the salvation of the country. 

I state this fact before the entire world 
with the deepest conviction of its truth. 



New York, January, 1914!. 



